Phone hacking and privacy torts

July 29, 2011

By Megan Richardson

Who before last week would have predicted there would be serious talk of a statutory privacy tort in Australia with politicians coming out openly in support of it?  But then who would have predicted a phone hacking scandal engulfing the Murdoch press?

The Australian’s senior legal writer Chris Merritt last weekend dismissed the connection saying we have criminal law to deal with phone hacking plus defamation and other laws to protect individuals, and questioning the need for a privacy tort – especially one as draconian in its treatment of the Australian media as that recommended by the Australian Law Reform Commission. What this discussion sidesteps, as much of the discussion I have read to date in the press, is that we already have common law protection of privacy fashioned through case law, which does or should constrain the media.

A problem, I think, is that our main source of common law protection goes by the antiquated name of ‘breach of confidence’. This gives the false impression of a confider and confidant. In reality the compass is far broader – and the doctrine is really one of misuse of confidential information, including information of a private character. In the defence papers case Commonwealth v John Fairfax Mason J referred to breach of confidence as a doctrine restraining ‘the publication of confidential information improperly or surreptitiously obtained’, citing Swinfen Eady LJ in Lord Ashburton v Pape (1913) 2 Ch 469. More recently, in the possum abattoir case Australian Broadcasting Corporation v Lenah Game Meats, Gleeson CJ quoted Laws J in Hellewell v Chief Constable of Derbyshire [1995] 1 WLR 804 at 807 as saying:

If someone with a telephoto lens were to take from a distance and with no authority a picture of another engaged in some private act, his subsequent disclosure of the photograph would, in my judgment, as surely amount to a breach of confidence as if he had found or stolen a letter or diary in which the act was recounted and proceeded to publish it. In such a case, the law would protect what might reasonably be called a right of privacy, although the name accorded to the cause of action would be breach of confidence. It is, of course, elementary that, in all such cases, a defence based on the public interest would be available.

Gleeson CJ agreed with that proposition, adding that to adapt it to the Australian context account should also be taken of the freedom of political communication which the High Court has held implicit in the democratic principles of the Australian Constitution. This suggests that the defence is particularly stringent where that implied freedom applies.

Lenah itself was a surreptitious filming case. Animal rights activists secretly entered the game meat abattoir’s property to film its possum slaughter processes then handed the film (through an intermediary) to the ABC who proposed to show on its 7.30 Report. Lenah sought an interlocutory injunction to stop this but did not claim breach of confidence, conceding rather that the information as to its animal slaughter methods was not confidential. Instead it argued the High Court should recognise a new tort of privacy to cover their case. Gleeson CJ said that breach of confidence would have been adequate to cover the case if ‘the activities filmed were private’. Even if so, the Chief Justice’s references to the public interest defence and constitutional freedom of communication suggests the ABC might have had a good defence. As Kirby J pointed out in his judgment, this was a government licensed abattoir and the public is entitled to know that the government is concerned to ensure that animals at the abattoir are being treated humanely (so far as an abattoir designed to kill animals can do so). The Australian government’s recent action over live meats exports shows it accepts this responsibility, and the ABC’s role in uncovering the problems there is worth noting and preserving.

We only need to imagine a slightly different fact situation to see Lenah as a strong authority on breach of confidence’s protection of privacy. Although some judges in the High Court questioned whether a corporation concerned about its public reputation was the best privacy claimant (Gummow and Hayne JJ especially), it was clear that the situation would have been different if the claimant had been an individual filmed or photographed while engaged in a private activity. For instance, Gleeson CJ said, ‘a film of a man in his underpants in his bedroom would ordinarily have the necessary quality of privacy to warrant the application of the law of breach of confidence’ – as would ‘information relating to health, personal relationships, or finances’. If the information was surreptitiously or otherwise improperly obtained, there is a good argument that its publication could be restrained or a remedy granted after the fact on the basis of breach of confidence, unless a public interest could be shown to justify the publication.

These are not just hypothetical scenarios that could never arise in Australia. In fact, the prospect of an improperly obtained video recording of a man in his underpants being aired on Australian television was very real in Donnelly v Amalgamated Television Services, where an interlocutory injunction was obtained (although, as often occurs in cases where other grounds are available, breach of confidence as such was not relied on). Lara Bingle’s objection to publication of the infamous shower picture in Woman’s Day is one example and in my view she had a potential claim that might have succeeded if she had chosen to pursue her action. Certainly, there are English cases where confidentiality claims against the media have succeeded involving weaker arguments of privacy and stronger arguments of free speech than were apparent in the Bingle scenario.

That many of those English cases have arisen in the wake of the Human Rights Act 1998 makes their authority in the Australian context more debatable. The Act brings into English law the European Convention on Human Rights, including the right to privacy in Article 8 along with the right to free speech in Article 10, and gives English courts the responsibility to develop its law in accordance with those rights. Perhaps it may be argued that the absence of an equivalent Bill of Rights at the Australian level means that privacy is not, or need not be, so highly valued here. But can this be said of private phone hacking? I would think many Australians would consider this a breach of their privacy.

And it would likely be a breach of confidence as well. Well before the Human Rights Act, the English case of Francome v Mirror Group Newspapers Ltd (1984) 2 ALL ER 408 concerned an illegal ‘bug’ placed on the jockey John Francome’s private telephone line. The tapes had been offered for sale to the Daily Mirror whose reporters approached Francome to confirm their authenticity. Francome and his wife promptly brought an action in breach of confidence seeking an interlocutory injunction to stop its publication of the transcripts, or extracts. The defendants denied liability and argued, alternatively, that publication was justified in the public interest as exposing Francome’s breaches of racing rules. Thus, they said, the balance of convenience lay in their favour, so the injunction should not be granted. However, the Court of Appeal held that the unlawful telephone tap was improper obtaining, the newspaper which had notice of the wrongdoing would also be liable as a third party for breach of confidence if it went ahead with its publication, and the public interest did not justify this since the tapes could have been given to the police or jockey club to deal with through official channels. Surely this case shows that in Australia as well as the United Kingdom unlawful telephone tapping by the media would be a prima facie breach of confidence, and that given the unlawfulness of the conduct the burden on the media to show the public interest supports its action is very high – although a court might allow an argument that there is good ground to suspect misconduct and the police could not be left to handle the investigation.

But to revert to my earlier point, the significance of breach of confidence in cases such as Francome is not widely known. In answer, then, to the question of whether there would be any advantage in a new statutory tort of privacy, I suggest transparency is one. If even The Australian’s senior legal reporter does not refer to breach of confidence what is the rest of Australia’s population to make of their legal rights in the (hopefully unlikely) scenario they find their telephones tapped for media reporting on some current story?

That said, there may be better ways to acknowledge the importance of freedom of speech and the media than in the Australian Law Reform Commission’s proposed statutory tort (where it is a matter to be ‘taken into account’ in a court’s determination of invasion of privacy). I was part of an expert group of the New South Wales Law Reform Commission whose proposed statutory cause of action for invasion of privacy tries to give more explicit account to freedom of speech and the media. The Victorian Law Reform Commission in its recent proposal for a cause of action for misuse of private information has gone further still, providing a full public interest defence. To me that seems the best approach to date. As Michael Kirby was quoted in an article in last weekend’s Australian, privacy may be a human right but so equally is freedom of speech and the media. Rather than giving either automatic precedence both should be acknowledged in any privacy cause of action and if need be they should be ‘reconciled’ in cases.

So, in the end, the judge’s central role in deciding privacy cases seems inescapable. In other words, we rely on the media to report freely but in cases where media seems too intrusive of individual privacy we should trust judges to exercise appropriate oversight.

Megan Richardson is a professor at the Melbourne Law School

An edited version of this piece has featured at theconversation.edu.au

(return to the top of this edition)


Weapons in the Piracy Wars: COICA and Domain Name Seizures

March 17, 2011

By Jake Goldenfein

You may have encountered this image if you recently tried to stream a sporting event online. Domain name seizures in the US occur under civil forfeiture and seizure provisions in the Crimes and Criminal Procedure title of the United States Code. Being territorially restricted, those provisions allow the US Immigration and Customs Enforcement agency (ICE) to distrain websites with a .com, .net or .org suffix.

Recent seizures of websites linking streamed sporting events (conveniently 10 days before the Super Bowl) were the directive of phase 3 of ICE’s Operation ‘In Our Sites,’ which began in June 2010. The mandate of ‘In Our Sites’ goes beyond sporting events however, and has targeted websites connected to counterfeit goods, child pornography and first-run movies. Although the process and propriety of those seizures have been questioned, presently working its way through the US political system is the Combating Online Infringement and Counterfeits Act (COICA) that will provide an expedited process to block domains and extend ICE’s reach to content hosted outside the US.

COICA (S. 3804) would authorise the Attorney General to obtain injunctions in rem against websites ‘dedicated to infringing activities.’ Sites are defined as dedicated to infringing activities if ‘primarily designed’, have ‘no demonstrable commercially significant purpose or use other than,’ or are ‘marketed by its operator,’ as offering copyright infringing goods.

Effectively, COICA creates an internet blacklist with ‘offending’ websites added by Court order. Originally there was a second blacklist controlled by the Attorney General without judicial oversight, however that was jettisoned in the bill’s latest iteration. By obtaining a Federal Court injunction, the Attorney General orders U.S. domain name registrars to stop resolving blacklisted domains, leading users instead to an error message.

For infringing domains outside of the U.S, the bill demands internet service providers block offending foreign addresses. This does not prevent access outside of U.S territory, but rather is aimed at preventing the importation into the US (censoring) of goods and services offered by websites deemed ‘dedicated’ to infringing activities.

Introduced by Democratic Senator Patrick Leahy in September, the bill received unanimous approval by the Senate Judiciary Committee in November 2010 under Leahy’s chair. Not surprisingly three of Leahy’s top five campaign contributors are large media organisations. Yet substantial opposition from various groups including Internet Engineers, Human Rights Groups, the Net Coalition, some Senators, and law professors has been successful in preventing the bill passing a full vote on the Senate floor, leading to another Judiciary Committee hearing on 16 February, which led to discussion of substantial modification, and likely a follow-up hearing.

Arguments against the bill include:

  • Blacklisting of websites by Justice Department officials without sufficient judicial oversight offends due process and threatens legitimate political speech.
  • Definitions within the bill, including ‘facilitating infringement’ and ‘dedicated to infringing activities’ are very broad.
  • Blacklisting for copyright infringement purposes may undermine U.S. secondary liability law as well as existing copyright exceptions, limitations and defences.
  • The censorship process causes entire domains to vanish, not just infringing pages or files.
  • The bill creates precedent for internet censorship, and congress should consider the effect for countries less protective of citizens’ rights of free expression.
  • The extraterritorial reach of the court prevents a full and fair trial with all interested parties present.
  • The bill may affect legitimate digital services such as cyberlockers if the Department of Justice decides that piracy is ‘central’ to their businesses.
  • Blacklisting may apply to sites that discuss and advocate for P2P technology or piracy because they sometimes link tools and information intended for file sharing, despite the otherwise political nature of their speech.
  • Censorship may undermine the stability of the internet by encouraging the use of circumvention measures and rerouting internet traffic away from the U.S.

But perhaps the most compelling arguments are found in the joint letter from 49 legal academics in the U.S. Citing jurisprudence, they contend ‘the bill amounts to a constitutional abridgment of freedom of speech because it directs courts to impose “prior restraints” on speech, which are the most serious and least tolerable infringement of First Amendment rights.’ They argue such cases ‘require a court, before the material is completely removed from circulation to make a final determination that material is unlawful after an adversary hearing.’

Contrary to that requirement, the professors claim ‘the Act permits the issuance of speech-suppressing injunctions without any meaningful opportunity for any party to contest the Attorney General’s allegations of unlawful content’ because of inadequate notice provisions and the capacity to enter injunctions ex parte. Requiring the shut down of entire domains rather than blocking specific content is described in the letter as ‘burning down the house to roast the pig.’

More profound however, is the academics’ claim that the bill’s ‘egregious Constitutional infirmities… will not survive judicial scrutiny’ suggesting its significance ‘is entirely symbolic.’ This would be the first time the US would require internet service providers to block speech because of its content. Enjoining ISPs to police users’ activities is an issue of growing judicial significance, not simply in circumstances like the iiNet case in Australia, but also for a range of future measures, including filtering, censorship and levying, that may require ISP cooperation.

Content industries have sought this law for years, and view the new capabilities as a magic bullet for copyright enforcement, with the MPAA and RIAA extensively lobbying for its passage. Lauding the legislation, the bill’s proponents emphasize the derisory economic consequences affected by infringing rogue sites. Previous MPAA interim boss Bob Pisano defended the bill, claiming targeted sites ‘exist for one purpose only – to make a profit using the internet to distribute the stolen and counterfeited goods and ideas of others,’ and that the ‘economic impact of these activities – millions of lost jobs and dollars – is profound.’ Pisano argues the First Amendment was not intended as a shield for those who steal, irrespective of the means. ‘Theft is theft, whether it occurs in a dark alley or in the ether, and to attempt to distinguish the two is to undermine the most basic tenets of our criminal laws.’

Clearly rhetoric laden, such speech reverts back to the questionable conflation of tangible and intellectual goods, and co-opts morality for its justification without acknowledging the concomitant censorship issues. However, other Hollywood groups have claimed that concerns of unlawful censorship are an ‘absurd misrepresentation of civic rights’.

For organisations like MPAA and RIAA who maintain a controversial program of prosecuting online copyright infringement, the new law would amount to another weapon in the arsenal of content protection. But beyond copyright, the bill highlights emerging issues in digital censorship and jurisdiction by entrenching in U.S law filtering of international content that offends local laws – a dangerous precedent that may expand to other types of speech. Passage of this bill would mark a substantial shift in lawmakers’ willingness to regulate cyberspace and a fortiori against the principle of the Single Global Internet.

Jake Goldenfein is a PhD candidate at the Melbourne Law School

(return to the top of this edition)


Too Many Academics? The Experience of Privacy Law Reform

March 4, 2011

By Professor Megan Richardson

Are there too many academics involved in law reform? There are obvious benefits to academic input (speaking for law academics generally). We have expertise, excellent critical facilities and an enthusiasm for law reform. I do not know a single law academic who does not want to make things better in their chosen field. We often dwell on the need for improvements in the law in our articles, chapters and books. But we can also be opinionated and individualistic. And since our academic reputation is built around personal influence rather than achieving group success we find it hard to give in when it comes to a disputed position of principle.

Take privacy law reform for instance. When the Australian Law Reform Commission compiled a group of academics, of which I was one, to define ‘privacy’ for purposes of its law reform project in 2006, we spent a day in a room arguing about the meaning of privacy and since we could not agree on any coherent and constructive concept for law reform purposes defaulted to the most anodyne definition we could all agree on. Since then, each of the Australian, New South Wales and Victorian Law Reform Commissions has reported on privacy. Each had much support and involvement from academics. And each has come up with a different set of proposals for a privacy cause of action.

Although it is widely agreed that it would be best to have a single set of privacy standards that apply uniformly through all of the Australian states and territories, our law reform bodies are unable apparently to come to a common position on what those standards should be. The Australian Law Reform Commission in its 2008 report For Your Information only wants invasions of privacy that would be highly offensive to the reasonable person of ordinary sensibilities to be the subject of a statutory cause of action.

This is in addition to a general requirement that the claimant has a reasonable expectation of privacy. The New South Wales Commission in its 2009 Invasion of Privacy report would dispense with the highly offensive threshold and rest its standard for a statutory cause of action on violation of a reasonable expectation of privacy.

The Victorian Commission in its 2010 Report on Surveillance in Public Places would reinstate a high offensiveness threshold and also specify two privacy causes of action as (1) public disclosure of private information and (2) intrusion on seclusion (the latter read broadly here to encompass covert personally intrusive conduct such as upskirt filming in public places). In addition, it would add a specific defence of public interest. By contrast, the Australian and New South Wales Commissions take the view that the public interest in the defendant’s actions can be adequately accommodated in the general standards.

All these recommendations are interesting to have on the table but the practical question is will they produce useful legal change? Or will we end up in the position where for lack of agreement on what should be done nothing is done?

It is already very clear that there will be opposition from parts of the media to any proposals for privacy law reform, with some quite persuasive arguments being mounted – for instance, that we have got along fine without legislative privacy protection in the past; that the common law provides or will provide sufficient protection where needed including through the equitable action for breach of confidence which has been recognised by courts as giving considerable protection against the misuse of private information; that Australian media are generally self-restrained; and that there are large segments of the population who don’t care much for privacy anyway.

Each of these arguments can be countered: for instance, that the common law’s protection of privacy while good suffers from some uncertainty and lack of transparency; that although the media may be generally self-restrained there have been cases involving media defendants and anyway controlling the media is not the only concern; that although individual preferences for privacy may vary individuals may still legitimately desire a degree of individual control on matters essentially going to personal identity. But until there is a clear consensus on the shape of privacy law reform, I suspect that for Australian legislators it will be all too easy to stick with the devil we know.

For my part, although I was a member of the New South Wales advisory group and involved in its proposals, I like the way the Victorian proposals provide for an explicit balancing between privacy and free speech since I think media and other defendants should have the opportunity to justify their actions as in the public interest.

If supporting a particular claim of privacy is clearly against the public interest (and I am talking about the public interest in John Stuart Mill’s sense of genuine public benefit or avoidance of harm and not simply the satisfaction of public curiosity), why should our laws and legal institutions support it?

On the other hand, I do not support the Australian and Victorian recommendation for a threshold of high offensiveness to the reasonable person. I fear this would be an excuse for some defendants to seek to dismiss genuinely felt claims of privacy as trivial – so avoiding the need to defend their actions as serving the public interest under the public interest defence.

In short, I prefer the New South Wales proposal for reasonable expectation of privacy as the threshold but followed up with a public interest defence to a prima facie privacy invasion. Moreover, I also prefer a generic privacy cause of action to more specifically delineated ones that may not capture every instance of privacy invasion as experienced down the line. ‘Seclusion’, for instance, is a potentially limiting concept no matter how broadly some may seek to construe it. And I cannot understand why overt surveillance should be treated more leniently than covert surveillance. I could go on … But, by now, in true academic fashion I am drifting down the path of fashioning yet another set of proposals for privacy law reform.

Perhaps if Australia was a less populous, less diverse and less argumentative society we would solve the problem of multiple opinions from multiple academics by having only a handful of academics who can basically agree involved in law reform functions in a given area. That’s what happens in New Zealand. For instance, when the New Zealand Law Commission undertook the task of reporting on privacy law reform it established its own ‘academic reference committee’. Yet this did not prevent it coming up with a single set of proposals (to let the common law continue to develop its own privacy tort/s, as already indicated by the courts) in its 2010 report on Invasion of Privacy. But Australia is not New Zealand and it seems we cannot avoid having continuing discussion and debate on issues to do with privacy law reform, especially when academics are involved.

Megan Richardson is a Professor of Law at The University of Melbourne.

(return to the top of the edition)


Follow

Get every new post delivered to your Inbox.

Join 666 other followers