The Return of Duff Beer – Only This Time it’s ‘Legendary’

November 4, 2011

By Amanda Scardamaglia

Fifteen years after South Australian Brewing and Lion Nathan Australia had their plans to sell Duff beer thwarted by the Federal Court, German brewer Eschweger Klosterbrauerei is selling its ‘Legendary Duff Beer’ in Australia.

Available at a most independent bottle shops and online, the German Pilsner, was first launched in Europe, where it has been sold for a number of years. The brewer’s website boasts its Duff Beer was awarded the DLG Medal in 2011 (an award given by Germany’s independent drinks and food testing society). It was also recognised as a bestseller in 2010 and one of Germany’s most successful new products.

Although the German brewer has registered its red label bearing the word ‘Duff’ as a trade mark in the EU, the application has been opposed, presumably by Twentieth Century Fox, Matt Groening and his production company, as the product is not licensed or authorised by the producers of The Simpsons television series, in which the beer featured. A search of ATMOSS indicates that the company has not sought to register the trade mark in Australia.

So how, if at all, is this Duff beer different from the product marketed by South Australian Brewing and Lion Nathan Australia in the 1990s? And more importantly, will the Legendary Duff Beer suffer the same fate as its predecessor, at least in Australia?

The Nature of the Potential Claim

Trade mark lawyers and students will recall the proceedings brought by Twentieth Century Fox and Matt Groening Productions against two local Australian brewers who had marketed its own brand of ‘Duff’ beer. In a claim for passing off and a breach of section 52 and 53 of the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth) (now section 18 and section 29 of Schedule 2 of the Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth), the producers of The Simpsons sought to prevent the breweries from promoting or dealing with any product using the same or similar get-up and incorporating the name Duff Beer, as depicted in the television series. The producers also asked that the breweries be restrained from using the name Duff or any deceptively similar name in relation to beverages, and from representing that their Duff beer was the product of the producers, or that it had the sponsorship or approval of the producers.

The producers succeeded on all grounds of their claim, with the Court granting an injunction preventing the breweries from continuing to sell their Duff branded products, while all existing stock was pulled from store shelves and destroyed. The rest is part of The Simpsons’ folklore, with the already sold Duff beer becoming prized collector items. Indeed since the product was pulled from sale, some cases of the beer have fetched thousands of dollars in online auctions.

It is likely the producers would have the same claim against the German brewer Eschweger Klosterbrauerei and/or its local distributor/s. That is, a claim in passing off in the nature of character merchandising and also for a breach of section 18 (and section 29) of Schedule 2 of the Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth).

Drawing on the Court’s interpretation and application of the law with respect to character merchandising in the 1996 proceeding, it is hard to see how a court, if faced with making a determination with respect to Legendary Duff Beer, could come to a different result.

 (a) Reputation and Secondary Meaning

The word ‘Duff’ was conceived by Matt Groening in 1989 for use as the name of a fictionalised beer to feature in The Simpsons. As Homer’s drink of choice, Duff Beer is commonly depicted and referenced in the television series. Indeed, one whole episode of The Simpsons was devoted to the theme of Duff Beer, which was titled ‘Duffless’.

While Duff Beer is occasionally depicted as bottled beer in the television series, it is most prominently depicted as canned beer. The basic colours used are red, black, white and yellow, with the name Duff featured on the front of the can, in haphazard cartoon font.

In Groening’s affidavit evidence in the 1996 proceeding, he said that Duff Beer was intended to be one of several secondary characters and products that would play a continuing and essential part of the program. Interestingly, Groening said that he came up with the name Duff as a parody of the other one syllable American beers, like ‘Budd’ and Blitz.’

In light of this evidence, the Court in the South Australian Brewing case determined that the word ‘Duff’ had acquired a powerful secondary meaning, which the tort of passing off would protect. The fact that the case did not concern a fictional character but a make believe product was irrelevant. So in finding that Duff Beer had derived a distinctive character, the Court famously extended the principles which apply to character images or titles to the name of a fictional product. Clearly, the producers can rely on this finding as the basis upon which to make a claim against the use of the word Duff by the German brewer.

(b) Misrepresentation or Association

In the 1996 decision, the Court held that the use of the word Duff by the Australian brewers would induce customers into believing that the product had a connection or association with The Simpsons program. The Court came to this conclusion having regard to the fact that the respondents’ ‘… intention was to “sail as close as possible to the wind” in order to “cash in” on the reputation of “The Simpsons” without stepping over the line of passing off or deceit.’ So, rather than require evidence of consumer confusion, Tamberlin J found that mere association, which would arouse and recall connotations of fun, irreverence and parody which surrounded The Simpsons, was enough to satisfy the cause of action. In particular he stated:

‘The name “Duff” will induce customers into believing that the product has a connection or association with “The Simpsons” program, when in fact it has no connection whatsoever. The fact is there is not and never has been any association between the applicants and the respondents.  The implicit representation, in my view, is that the name “Duff Beer” produced by the breweries, is an embodiment of the fictional beer which features in the series. In reality, the product is a beer, which is manufactured in Australia by companies without any commercial or other association with the producers of the series.

…the deliberate creation by the breweries of an association by use of the name “Duff” between the breweries’ beer can with “The Simpsons” program, in circumstances where there is no association and indeed, where such an association is contrary to the express policy of the producers, amounts to misleading and deceptive conduct. There is no necessity to demonstrate that the viewer or consumer must think in specific terms of permission or allowance in order to constitute deceptive conduct. The intentional use of the name “Duff Beer” which produces the false association is sufficient …’

Whether a court would find the same in a claim involving the Legendary Duff Beer is slightly more contentious, given there are a number of differences between the Legendary Duff Beer and the beer produced by the local Australian breweries, and in turn, the Duff Beer featured in The Simpsons.

Firstly and most obviously, the Legendary Duff Beer is sold in bottles and not cans, whereas previously noted, Duff Beer is normally depicted as canned beer in the television program. Whether this detracts from the possibility that consumers would think there is some association is questionable – the word Duff remains the most prominent aspect of the packaging on the German beer.

The prominent use of red, black and white on the Legendary Duff Beer is somewhat different to the get-up of the can featured in the television series, as it does not feature the colour yellow.  Even so, the German brewer has used a similar haphazard cartoon font for the words ‘Duff Beer’.

The other significant difference here is the German Brewer’s use of the word ‘Legendary’. Does this sufficiently distinguish the German beer from any association with The Simpsons or does the term further embolden the association with the television program?

It is more probably the latter case. This is because it seems unlikely that the addition of the word ‘Legendary’ would sufficiently distinguish the goods from The Simpsons or that it would operate as a disclaimer so as to dispel any perceived association with The Simpsons and the German brewer.  Consider here what the Court had to say about whether the use of a disclaimer bearing the words ‘unauthorised’ would be sufficient in the later proceeding, when Tamberlin J was considering the scope of relief:

‘It is too simplistic an approach to suggest that the word “unauthorised”, coupled with the other forms of proposed disclaimer, must dispel any association with “The Simpsons”. … Moreover, given the evidence that “The Simpsons” program makes a point of “sending up” in a comic manner, other advertisers and advertisements, and given the irreverent nature of the content of the series, it is by no means beyond reasonable argument that the disclaimers would reinforce, rather than negate or diminish, any association with the series.’

Another important factor relates to the question of merchandising. The Simpson’s television series is highly merchandised. Much of this licensed merchandise relates specifically to Duff Beer, with the range including t-shirts and caps depicting the fictional beer. Tamberlin J took this into account in ultimately holding that the extent of existing merchandising would make it more likely that the public would think that The Simpsons had sanctioned the beer produced by the Australian breweries. The consequence of this was significant from the producers’ perspective in terms of the potential damage to The Simpsons brand – particularly as the producers had consistently refused to licence merchandise with respect to alcohol and tobacco products because of the series’ popularity with children. This is a policy the producers have maintained to this day. Thus, one would expect that, for this reason, the Legendary Duff Beer is of particular concern to Twentieth Century Fox and Matt Groening Productions.

Conclusion

It seems remarkable that, notwithstanding Australia’s recent history with Duff beer and the well publicised Federal Court decision, another company would enter the Australian market with an unauthorised Duff labelled beer. Expect to see more on this in the near future, particularly once the EU trade mark opposition claim is resolved. In the meantime, it might be worth grabbing a case of the Legendary Duff Beer and secure your potential collector’s item now.

Amanda Scardamaglia is a Lecturer in Law and Swinburne University and a PhD candidate at the Melbourne Law School.

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Patent, Trade Mark, Enforcement – the whole kit and caboodle, all in one exciting Bill…

April 7, 2011

By Kimberlee Weatherall

At an IP Academics’ conference in early February, I remember Professor Di Nicol asking, rhetorically, ‘where has all the patent reform gone?’ Di pointed out that we’d had any number of ACIP Reports, ALRC Reports (like that on Gene Patenting), and IP Australia Discussion Papers, all with no actual legislation resulting.

No more.

No doubt many are already aware of the Intellectual Property Laws Amendment (Raising the Bar) Bill. An exposure draft for this Bill was released by IP Australia on 3 March, with comments due last Monday, 4 April. The provisions of the Bill have been discussed at some length elsewhere, too, including some very interesting, thorough discussion of Schedule 1 on the Patentology blog.

In summary, the Bill has 6 Schedules, and mostly deals with patent, although it has some important Trade Mark bits too.

  • Schedule 1 is meant to be about ‘raising the quality of granted patents’, but, in short, it’s about standards for granting a valid patent. It covers everything from changing the way prior art is considered in assessing whether a patent has an inventive step, making the requirement of usefulness a bit more real by requiring a ‘specific, substantial, and credible use’ for the invention; to the effective abolition of ‘fair basis’ and its replacement with a concept of ‘support’ drawn from European law.
  • Schedule 2 proposes a new research exemption in patent, something that has been discussed for years now and is long overdue, to be honest.
  • Schedule 3 is meant to be about ‘reducing delays in resolution of patent and trade mark applications’, which seems to be mostly about finding ways to speed up patent and trade mark oppositions. I’m not entirely convinced the proposals will work, not least because I can’t see anything there that really deals with extensions of time in opposition proceedings that can really extend the time of an opposition. In any event, the proposed changes mostly create a framework within which more detailed regulations will be made. It is hard, therefore, to predict the ultimate outcome of these reforms.  Perhaps more important (and likely more effective) are the proposed amendments to divisional patent applications. ‘Divisionals’ happen (in general) when a patent application is ‘split’ into more than one application. The basic idea is fine, of course, but it can be used in all kinds of interesting strategic ways, including, at the moment, splitting an application off into a divisional when the main application is opposed by someone else – thus getting a patent through faster without the opposition applying to it. Under the proposed changes, applicants will only be able to file divisionals up to the date by which oppositions have to be filed. So, at least if an opposition is filed at the very end of the opposition period, it won’t be possible to split off a divisional patent to avoid the impact of a patent opposition. There are a few other strategic moves that are discussed in the Explanatory Memoranda which will be precluded by this change. The change seems fair to me.
  • Schedule 4 is about ‘assisting the operation of the IP profession’ – and deal with patent attorney privilege (like legal privilege, but for patent and Trade Mark attorneys) as well as some disciplinary stuff, and material about registering attorney firms. Potentially interesting stuff in there that tries to define what counts as giving ‘intellectual property advice’ – raises interesting questions about what bits of what attorneys do, don’t count as giving legal advice.
  • Schedule 5 is about enforcement. It makes some substantial changes to enforcement at the border, mostly by introducing a requirement that people whose goods are seized on the insistence of a trade mark or copyright owner will now have to positively claim their goods (rather than having them returned as a matter of course if legal proceedings aren’t commenced within 10 days by the IP owner). We also have a full re-write of the trade mark criminal offences (creating two levels, summary and indictable, like in the Copyright Act), and the addition of additional damages for ‘flagrancy’ in civil proceedings.
  • Schedule 6 is (allegedly) about ‘Simplifying the IP system’. It covers a miscellaneous collection of stuff, including (a) giving jurisdiction over design matters to the Federal Magistrates’ Court, (b) amending secret use in patent law, (c) ‘fixing up’ aspects of the grace period in patent; (d) a new system to allow the Commissioner to revoke acceptance of a patent prior to grant; and (e) repealing the requirement in s 45 for a patent applicant to inform the Commissioner of the results of certain searches,

With such a smorgasbord of issues, it’s hard to know what to comment on. Much of what I might otherwise have said about the patent stuff has already been said by Patentology: that attempting to raise the bar in inventive step is a good idea but the amendments probably don’t go far enough; that the change in the usefulness requirement is good for biological type inventions where patents have been granted for fairly speculative ‘uses’. (I disagree with Patentology about experimental use I have to say – I think we need the exception in there, although I dread it’s going to end up being narrowly read by our courts).

But here’s a couple of things that haven’t been discussed in the Patentology comments or by Warwick Rothnie:

First, we have a pretty complete re-write of the trade mark criminal offences here, using that awful, awful style of criminal drafting that seems to prevail at a Federal level these days (if you remember the new copyright criminal offences, introduced in 2006, you’ll get the picture – pages and pages of text and none of us any the wiser about what it means because you have to go to the Criminal Code to even begin making any sense of it). I suppose we should be grateful that there’s no proposal here to introduce Infringement Notices, as we had in copyright back in 2006 (then again, it would be hard to justify introducing infringement notices in trade mark when they haven’t even been used in copyright for years after coming into the legislation, wouldn’t it?). But two things are really interesting about the trade mark criminal offences. First, some of the offences apply a standard of ‘negligence’ to the mental element. Thus it will be a summary offence to apply a mark to goods, being negligent as to whether the mark is, or is substantially identical to, a registered trade mark. The first problem is – why would negligence be an appropriate standard here at all? Well, so I thought the Explanatory Memorandum might help here. So I went to look, and it says this:

‘It is appropriate to have a lower fault element of ‘negligence’ for the circumstance elements of the offences because of the unique nature of intellectual property rights. Despite the clear legal position that intellectual property is a form of personal property, evidence has shown that some people see the violation of intellectual property rights as trivial and a ‘victimless crime’. Such attitudes may extend to an unacceptable failure to ascertain the factual circumstances in which their conduct would be criminal. However, consistent with the general approach taken to other forms of personal property, and to copyright goods, a person who uses a registered Trade Mark (what could be another person’s property) should be under an objective obligation to check that the mark is not registered. Otherwise, the effectiveness of the deterrent is undermined, with the risk that intellectual property rights are less protected than tangible property rights. The introduction of an objective negligence standard will assist the effective administration of justice and perform an important educative role in ensuring that people take intellectual property crime seriously.’

OK – what? So hang on, failing to check the trade marks register when you’re applying a mark to goods could be a criminal offence, because one ought to check the register? And we want it to be criminal because that will ‘perform an important educative role’? Last theory on this kind of thing I read suggests over-criminalising behaviour that the average person does not think as criminal is not likely to increase respect for either trade mark law or criminal law.

And I still don’t even know what it means to be [criminally] ‘negligent’ about whether your mark is identical to a registered mark. Doesn’t ‘negligence’ import some kind of understanding of what would be considered appropriate standards of behaviour (you know, reasonable man/woman and all that?) And if that’s true, what is the standard of vigilance about branding activity that is considered socially acceptable these days? Is Woolworths criminally negligent for using ‘honest to goodness’, that being the trade mark of some organic supplier or other? Honestly, I wonder whether they really think these things through sometimes.

Something else that hasn’t got a lot of comment is this new customs scheme for requiring people whose goods are seized to actively claim their goods. I don’t know, and I’ve not thought it through sufficiently, but I wonder whether that is consistent with Article 55 of TRIPS, that says goods shall be returned if the IP owner doesn’t commence proceedings to continue the suspension. I mean, I know that you can have further customs procedures without breaching TRIPS (you can have payable duties and the like), but can you impose a further element (this claim scheme) that is clearly geared entirely towards assisting IP owners in enforcement and that leads to forfeiture, effectively on the grounds of claimed infringement, without legal proceedings? I’m not at all sure about that.

Here’s another interesting little beastie in the Bill. Proposed s 50A of the Patents Act. This would give the Patent Commissioner power to revoke an acceptance any time before grant. The explanatory memorandum says it will help with admin type problems, but it seems to me that it might be used like the equivalent Trade Mark Act provisions are being used – as a kind of opposition-lite, where a prospective opponent writes to the Commissioner asking them to exercise their discretion to revoke – without going through the full opposition process. I see the potential for more strategic game playing, even as the Bill has tried to remove other parts of the Act that have facilitated various interesting patenting and patent dispute strategies.

Overall, too, I wonder about some of the moves in patent. It feels like IP Australia has deliberately sought to shift Australian law closer to European patent law – for example, using European language in relation to support and other documentary requirements. Why Europe? Why European law in particular? Aren’t we meant, under our Free Trade Agreement with the US, to be ‘endeavour[ing] to reduce differences in law and practice between [Australia and the US], including in respect of differences in determining the rights to an invention, the prior art effect of applications for patents, and the division of an application containing multiple inventions’? (AUSFTA Article 17.9.14). I mean, I’m not a big AUSFTA fan, as you may know, but this does look quite a lurch in a different direction, which makes you wonder whether Article 17.9.14 has any relevance at all…

One more thing worthy of comment – Item 86 in Schedule 6 amends, and broadens, another copyright exception. This is the one found in the Patents Act s 226, and allows reproduction and other uses of documents open to public inspection. I’ve said it before, I’ll say it again. Every time the government decides it is going to create a new little copyright exception so it can do something it needs to do, it really ought to be asking itself: why do I have to do this? And wouldn’t it make more sense to introduce a general, fair-use type exception? Honestly???

Kimberlee Weatherall is a senior lecturer at the University of Queensland

This article was cross-posted here at LawFont

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“Where the Bloody Hell Are You?”: Lara Bingle in Search of a Cause of Action

March 12, 2010

by Jason Bosland and Vicki Huang

On March 1, 2010, Woman’s Day published a nude picture of Lara Bingle which was allegedly taken in 2006 while she had a “secret” affair with AFL star Brendon Fevola (who was and still is married to Alex Fevola).

The image shows Bingle in a shower trying to cover herself with her hands.  The expression on her face clearly depicts distress.  Apparently, the photo had been passed by Fevola to other people and had been “doing the rounds” for years.

The day after publication by Woman’s Day, Lara Bingle by way of her publicist Max Markson, announced she would take legal action against Fevola for 1) breach of privacy, 2) defamation and 3) misuse of her image.

Fiona Connolly said that Woman’s Day which has about 400,000 readers, published the photo because it was “going to come out anyway”.  She also said that Woman’s Day did not pay for the photo and would not disclose how they came to obtain the photo.

Lara Bingle’s publicist is reported to have said that Bingle had retained all her contracts and would move past the incident.

In an interesting turn of events, on March 8, Woman’s Day (the same magazine that printed the photo) published an exclusive interview with Bingle depicting “her side of the story”.  The fee for the interview was not disclosed but is rumoured to be around $200,000.  According to her publicist, Bingle has decided to give an “undisclosed amount” of money to the White Ribbon Foundation which is a charity that opposes domestic violence.

The controversy has sparked a myriad of comments.  The Fortnightly Review looks at the issue from a legal perspective.  We believe it is an important case given the rise of cyber-bullying and “sext-ing” in the community – something we will be commenting on in a future issue of the FR. We emphasise that Bingle’s statement of claim has not become available so we comment on the facts that are thus far publicly known.

Privacy and Misuse of Image

It is unclear just what causes of action is meant by the terms “breach of privacy” and “misuse of image”.  Is Bingle’s intention to argue that an Australian court should recognise a common law cause of action for breach of privacy (flagged as a possibility in ABC v Lenah Game Meats) – or will she be content to rely on the existing law of breach of confidence, as used for instance in the recent Victorian Court of Appeal decision in Giller v Procopets.  Unfortunately, she will have to traverse this tricky field of developing law very carefully. The picture is even more confused when it comes to the claim for misuse of image.  Is this again shorthand for privacy arguments considered above?  Or might she be considering actions for passing off and misleading or deceptive conduct under the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth), as celebrities have often done in the past (including Bingle herself).  The difficulty with a passing off or TPA claim is that Bingle will have to show that Fevola made some kind of misrepresentation in the course of trade – and we find it hard to see either a misrepresentation or conduct in the course of trade on facts currently known to us.

The civil remedies we believe she may be seeking are uncertain here.  Perhaps the criminal law as suggested by other bloggers may give her some satisfaction.  Nevertheless, her arguments as to defamation do target a well developed area of law, however it is unclear as to whether she can satisfy the legal elements.

Defamation

From the facts known, it appears that Bingle is claiming that the distribution by Fevola of the photograph between various members of the AFL and the Australian Cricket Team amounts to defamation.

In order to make out the defamation cause of action, she is required to show that the publication of the photograph, assessed as a whole, conveyed one or more defamatory imputations about her.  There are three non-exhaustive ‘tests’ for determining whether an imputation carries a defamatory meaning.  At a very basic level, it must, in the eyes of the ordinary, reasonable reader or viewer:

  1. lower the plaintiff in the estimation of others;
  2. cause the plaintiff to be shunned or avoided; or
  3. expose the plaintiff to hatred, contempt or ridicule.

And, herein lies the main obstacle for Bingle’s claim. It is difficult to see how the first two tests – the ‘lowering estimation’ and ‘shun and avoid’ tests – could be satisfied merely on the basis that Bingle was naked in the shower and had an unwanted photograph taken of her.  Indeed, we have all been naked in the shower, and it is unlikely that the ordinary, reasonable person would think less of Bingle or shun and avoid her simply on that basis.  Certainly, as required under the ‘lowering estimation’ test, it is hard to see how a reasonable, ordinary viewer of the photograph could ascribe any blame to Bingle for the taking of the photograph.

A conclusion about this, of course, depends on any additional material that may have accompanied the distribution of the photograph and which may modify the imputations carried by its publication – ie, it may, depending on the circumstances of the publication, carry an imputation of promiscuity or that she acquiesced in the taking and distribution of the photograph (see, in particular, Shepherd v Walsh & Ors ).  There is also the possibility, of course, that Bingle might plead defamatory meaning based on ‘true innuendo’ (ie by relying on extrinsic facts that were, in fact, known to its recipients).

Under the third test, however, there is authority to suggest that Bingle might have, at the very least, an arguable case on the basis of the publication of the photograph itself.  Thus, it was held in the well-known case of Ettinghausen v Australian Consolidated Press that the publication in a magazine (called ‘HQ’) of a photograph of the plaintiff, a famous Rugby League footballer, naked in the shower with his penis exposed, had the capacity to defame the plaintiff by exposing him to a more than trivial degree of ridicule.  The imputation pled by the plaintiff in that case was simply that ‘[t]he plaintiff is a person whose genitals have been exposed to the readers of the defendant’s magazine ‘HQ’, a publication with a wide readership.’  The ease with which the judge, Hunt J, arrived at his conclusion is astounding (although this can be, at least partly, explained on the basis that this imputation was pled in the alternative).  There was absolutely no analysis whatsoever as to how this imputation had the capacity to expose the plaintiff to ridicule, which has been held to mean ‘deserving to be laughed at’ or ‘absurd’ (see Boyd v Mirror Newspapers Ltd [1980] NSWLR 449 at 453). Significantly, there was no suggestion that there was anything unusual about the way the plaintiff was depicted. There was nothing ‘grotesque, monstrous or obscene’ about the photograph and it did not seem to make a ‘preposterously ridiculous spectacle’ of the plaintiff.  It was simply a photograph of a naked man in a communal shower, as is the usual practice following any football match.

In light of this yardstick, it is difficult to see how the photograph of Bingle – which also involves mere nudity – should be decided any differently, at least in relation to the judge’s question as to whether or not the photograph has the capacity to defame.  This leaves, of course, the further question of whether the photograph in fact bears the defamatory meaning – a question of fact not answered by the jury in Ettinghausen.

One potential problem for Bingle, however, is that even if defamatory meaning is established on the basis that a reasonable reader would view the plaintiff in a ridiculous light, it would be particularly easy for Fevola to rely on the defence of justification.  Thus, it is likely that Fevola could defend the publication on that basis that the imputation – the nudity – is, in fact, true.  In NSW, the scope of the truth defence in this context underwent particularly significant change following the introduction of the uniform defamation laws across Australia.  In particular, it removed the requirement under the justification defence (as it had previously operated in that state) that the publication must also serve the public interest. Indeed, one of the issues raised when the Defamation Act 2005 (NSW) was passed was that the removal of the public interest requirement under the justification defence would put a stop to defamation acting as de facto privacy protection. Defendants would escape liability for invasions of privacy by simply proving that the defamatory imputations concerning the plaintiff’s private life were true. This case brings such concerns to the fore, but also highlights the inherent problem of protecting what are essentially privacy interests under a cause of action for which it is not designed.

We look forward to reading Bingle’s statement of claim.  We also look forward to your comments.


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