Keeping Secrets in Times of Weak Law

December 12, 2011

By Tiffany Wong, Oscar O’Bryan and Jake Goldenfein

Keeping anything secret seems like a challenge in today’s radically altered media landscape. Digitisation has abolished the cost of reproduction and networked environments expose information to actors with the capacity to leak, steal or vandalise for whatever purpose motivating them. Law hardly seems to have a role in a space where technological know-how trumps not only the regulation of secrets but also the digital architectures that protect them. But does that mean that law should retreat from regulating information, or rather, is it a time for redoubled analysis of law’s relationship to information and perhaps an open mind when looking at options for reform. Rather than harsher penalties and more vigorous enforcement, do we need more transformative approaches for dealing with the reality of our age of communicative abundance?

This year’s CMCL conference, ‘Keeping Secrets in Times of Weak Law’ answers the call for a critique of law’s role in keeping secrets and the institutions that determine when secrets should remain so.

Jake Goldenfein presented on the different forms of WikiLeaks and how its latest iteration of publishing uncensored and unredacted documents without institutional (mainstream media) oversight may be the only mode of transgression that can fulfil its ideological mission. Dan Hunter, Julian Thomas and Alana Maurushat constituted the Cybersecurity Panel, discussing the relationship between states, secrets and law. The session was chaired by David Lindsey. Philip Williams, David Brennan and Susan McMaster made up the Trade and Commercial Secrecy Panel, chaired by Beth Webster, discussing the economic arguments in the trade off between incentives to produce and incentives to enjoy information. And the Privacy Panel, chaired by Jason Bosland, included Megan Richardson, Michael Rivette, Michael Gawenda and the Honourable Michael Kirby, who discussed Lenah Game Meats – 10 years on, and the possibility of a statutory cause of action for privacy in Australia.

Cybersecurity

Dan Hunter, director of the Institute for Information Law and Policy at New York Law School, gave the Cybersecurity keynote, asking some pertinent questions about secrecy and security in the age of the Internet. In particular, why WikiLeaks was such a lightening rod for criticism and whether ‘control’ is the correct paradigm to inform the policies behind regulating secrecy.

The debate over WikiLeaks set the context for Hunter’s presentation. In asking why WikiLeaks, especially its release of unredacted cables was so derided by the institutions related to the rule of law (journalists, lawyers etc) Hunter critiqued those institutions for being unable to see the reality of today’s communications infrastructure and practices. Instead, Hunter claimed, those institutions rely on an ethic of control that propelled the ratcheting up of copyright laws since the Internet became publicly available 20 years ago, as well as informed the news media’s derision of WikiLeaks publishing without their oversight.

Hunter suggested that WikiLeaks may be a precursor for a change in policy regarding government secrecy and disclosure and asked what modern day information policies and practices should look like given the Internet and technologies like WikiLeaks. Regarding copyright, Hunter claimed control was not what creators sought and regarding secrets, Hunter alluded to substantial evidence suggesting administrators over-protect information in ways that are profoundly undemocratic. Now that we live with the idea of radical transparency as something we cannot really do anything about, Hunter claims we have to craft a policy that gives up on our misguided concerns about control despite the new dangers that may provoke.

Respondent, Julian Thomas, director of The Swinburne Institute for Social Research, discussed the extent to which the Internet has decentralised, diffused or democratised secrecy– and where WikiLeaks fits into this new equilibrium. Thomas claimed that the Internet has made states both less and more able to control information, where networks of freedom and networks of control lay alongside each other. WikiLeaks operates in this new networked society, claims Thomas, according to the model described by William Dutton as the 5th estate emerging from the network of networks. While sharing some features of the traditional press, the 4th estate, Thomas claimed this 5th estate is more than simply a supplemental ‘new’ media but operates in a space, where institutional and amateur expression are side by side, as are networks of freedom and networks of control exist within what Manuel Castells describes as the space of flows (not a space of places) where people find knowledge outside of institutional sources.

Alana Maurashat, director of UNSWS’s Cyberlaw and Policy Centre, discussed the regulation of hacking worldwide, noting her consultancy to the Canadian government to assist in crafting a reasonable policy in the field of ethical hacking. She saw WikiLeaks’ legacy as going beyond subsequent movements like Anonymous and Occupy, but rather depicted WikiLeaks as the leader, or image, of a whole system of e-government and e-revolutions, often coordinated by groups that have been considerably empowered by today’s technological conditions.

Trade and Commercial Secrecy

Beth Webster opened the panel by contextualising the importance of trade secrecy to Australian innovators, referring to the Australian Bureau of Statistics’ most recent innovation survey. This survey highlighted that 40 per cent of Australian businesses were innovation-active during the 12-month reference period and the most popular method of intellectual property (‘IP’) protection by these businesses was a secrecy or confidentiality agreement.

Keynote, Philip Williams (Chairman of Frontier Economics) offered an economist’s perspective on trade secrecy by posing the key economic problem arising from the protection of trade secrets: the trade-off between two incentives — the optimal incentives to produce information and the optimal incentives to enjoy information.  Economics has been able to articulate this problem, but has struggled to offer guidance for its resolution.

To illustrate this problem, Williams presented a simple economic model: a person spends a year of pain (‘Period 1’) to enjoy a year of gain (‘Period 2’).  The person may justify the pain by producing an asset, such as information, at the end of Period 1.  Enjoyment of that information in Period 2 constitutes the gain.  The person will only bear the pain in Period 1 if they believe that they will likely enjoy the information in Period 2.  Thus the person will likely seek legal or extra-legal protection of the information from appropriation.

Williams noted, however, that the trade secrecy context raised three complications to this model.  First, the creation of an asset does not draw a clear distinction between the two periods of activity — investment and enjoyment — since the asset will likely grow in value during Period 1.  Secondly, the asset may generate benefits for its creator through trade, whether or not the creation process has completed.  Thirdly, if the asset is information (a classic public good) difficulties arise with respect to trade.  In particular, a purchaser must know the information to determine its value — a problem also known as Arrow’s fundamental paradox of information.

Williams applied this model to the facts of Maggbury v Hafele (2001) 210 CLR 181 (‘Maggbury’), a High Court case in which the law dealt with the trade-off between the incentives to produce and enjoy an asset. Williams noted the economic inefficiency of restraining the use of information after that information had entered the public domain.  He suggested that restitutionary damages would have been a more efficient remedy by allowing Maggbury to recover the benefit of its investment and by allowing the use of publicly available information.  The key challenge in calculating the quantum, however, would be to determine the duration of Hafele’s head start, which Hafele gained by first access to the information.

 

The first commentator, David Brennan, engaged in a fuller discussion of remedies for breach of confidence. He highlighted the remedial uncertainties arising from the equitable jurisdiction of breach of confidence — remedies were at the court’s discretion, and equity provided weak guidance on the assessment of quantum.

In noting these problems with equitable remedies, Brennan argued injunctive relief would serve little purpose, given the defendant’s destruction of confidentiality; an account of profits could involve accounting problems since the significant intermingling of the defendant’s resources with the information; and equitable compensation, calculated on a counterfactual basis, might be dismissed by courts as too imprecise a measure of damages.

Brennan concluded by making suggestions for law reform.  To strengthen legal protection of confidential information and to deter the wrongful disclosure of such information, he submitted that an all-proceeds remedy would be preferable to injunctive relief where there was a breach of confidence which was: (a) in bad faith; (b) the wrongdoer benefited from the breach in an ascertainable and proximate manner; (c) the secrecy of the information has been destroyed by the breach; and (d) there was no market-based objective measure of harm.  Depending on the nature of the party’s breach and benefit, the appropriate remedy should be a constructive trust, and/or an account of profits without allowance for the wrongdoer’s contributions.

The second commentator, Susan McMaster (Senior Legal Counsel with CSIRO), provided the practical perspective of IP creators, including those who received and commercialised confidential information.  Drawing from her experience with CSIRO, McMaster acknowledged both the importance of trade secrecy in the private sector and the effectiveness of sharing knowledge to achieve impact from research results.

Secrecy, McMaster claimed, is crucial to the patent application process since patent registration hinges on the first-to-file system and the development of patentable subject matter through research and experimentation takes a long time. Further, secrecy is required for the commercialisation of public scientific research as investors are incentivised by the exclusive rights created by patent registration.

McMaster raised three key issues concerning the management of confidentiality agreements.  First, it may be unclear whether certain information is confidential.  Secondly, non-disclosure agreements must be drafted and used to enforce confidentiality, rather than to constitute a mere formality before commercial engagement.  Thirdly, a research organisation and its employees must refrain from receiving confidential information from third parties or entering into third-party confidentiality agreements if doing so would place the organisation at a commercial disadvantage.

 

Privacy

 

The final panel of the day, chaired by the CMCL’s Jason Bosland, considered the past, present and future of privacy protection under Australian law. The four speakers brought a wealth of academic, professional, industry and personal experience to panel, making for a discussion that was informative, candid and enjoyable.

The first speaker, Professor Megan Richardson framed the panel discussion around the future direction of privacy law in Australia – does Australia need a statutory cause of action for invasion of privacy, or should the common law protecting privacy interests (breach of confidence, defamation) be left to develop on its own? She noted the ‘careful silence’ of the federal government on the issue, only recently broken by the publication in September 2011 of an issues paper recommending the introduction of a statutory cause of action – a reaction, perhaps, to the resurgence of interest in the ever-expanding News of the World phone-hacking scandal.

Richardson dealt at length with the judicial reasoning in ABC v Lenah Game Meats as to whether the common law alone can protect (individual) privacy interests sufficiently, referring to Gleeson CJ’s discussion and approval of Hellewell v Chief Constable of Derbyshire as an example of the successful utilisation of the doctrine of breach of confidence to protect privacy. On the other hand however, Richardson noted the imperfections of the common law process, requiring plaintiffs to endure the ‘agonising’ process of adversarial litigation to have their interests recognised. She cited the Campbell, Mosley and Giller cases as pertinent examples of this. Richardson suggested that a statutory cause of action could make a positive difference if it were well-framed.

The second speaker was Michael Rivette, barrister at Chancery Chambers, who along with having successfully argued the privacy issues in the Giller v Procopets appeal, also maintains numerous professional and commercial interests in the media and communications sector. Rivette spoke of the continuing influence of the ABC v Lenah Game Meats case upon the development of the law of privacy, both in Australia and overseas. He suggested that the Victorian authority of Giller actually afforded greater privacy protection through breach of confidence than exists under the common law in both the UK and New Zealand. While he acknowledged the potential benefit of a statutory cause of action, Rivette highlighted the drawn-out nature of the law reform process, and said that in the mean time, ‘we have to do what we can with what we have’.

The third speaker was Michael Gawenda, whose perspective on the issues was coloured by his extensive experience as a career journalist and author. Gawenda noted that ‘journalists are in the business of invading people’s privacy’ on the basis of public interest, however he was clear that this end did not always justify the means (this can be contrasted with recent remarks by former News of the World journalist Paul McMullen). In particular he was critical of the idea that the apparent consent of a journalist’s subject to an invasion of privacy might legitimise or validate that invasion. In concluding, Gawenda was sceptical about the ability of the legal system to deal comprehensively with privacy issues, suggesting that perhaps the regulation (formal and informal) and culture of the media industries needed to change as well.

The final speaker was the Honourable Michael Kirby AC CMG. Kirby suggested that a consideration of privacy law should begin with the question: ‘Why do we want privacy?’ – framing the answer in terms of the ability to have control over our personal lives, arguing that personal privacy is important to our ‘fullness’ and ‘flourishing’ as human beings. In this sense, Kirby was of the European perspective that personal privacy is a human right which should be protected by the law. After highlighting the imperfections of the various options canvassed in the recent issues paper – do nothing, expand the role of the Press Council, rely upon the courts to develop the common law, et cetera – he came to the conclusion that the best way forward for privacy protection in Australia is the creation of a statutory cause of action for invasion of privacy.

The session highlighted the numerous stake-holders in the ongoing development of privacy law – the media, the legal profession, celebrities, ‘normal’ people – each with their own perspectives, concerns, and objectives. The task for the Australian law is to consider and balance all of these things in continuing to move towards a more coherent law of privacy.

Tiffany Wong is an LLB/BMus candidate at the University of Melbourne.

Oscar O’Bryan is holds an LLB from the Melbourne Law School.

Jake Goldenfein is a PhD candidate at the Melbourne Law School.

2 Comments | breach of confidence, Copyright, damages, defamation, Intellectual Property, Internet Law, Media law, piracy, Uncategorized, wikileaks | Tagged: , , , , , , , , , , | Permalink
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Has WikiLeaks Gone Far Enough?

November 4, 2011

By Jake Goldenfein

Before a full house at Sydney’s Festival of Dangerous Ideas the question was posed to Julian Assange – ‘has WikiLeaks gone far enough?’ His answer, of course, was an emphatic ‘no’. But in justifying that position Assange revealed more about his organisation’s mission and ethical validation than in many previous public appearances.

From Ellingham Hall in Norfolk, Assange’s image beamed into the Opera House theatre where he addressed not only whether WikiLeaks had gone far enough, but also what more WikiLeaks had to do. Questions since rendered more germane by the announcement that WikiLeaks has suspended further publication and may cease operations by the end of the year.

WikiLeaks and conspiracy

A passage cited from Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn’s novel Cancer Ward (in which a mother questions whether or not to burden her son with the rib-breaking weight of the truth) inferred Assange’s continuing mission and what WikiLeaks is yet to achieve – not simply greater transparency, but the revelation of hidden truth. While Assange acknowledges we can never really know ‘truth’, he argues what is false can be determined with enough information. And that negation, according to theory that animates WikiLeaks, exposes how governments strive for domination as well as the conspiracy that enlivens them.

For Assange, the conspiracy is a transnational security complex run amok. No longer a simple ‘patronage’ network or cold war relic but an elite security shadow state organised through confidential networks and agreements between military contractors and intelligence agencies. Assange cited research suggesting the existence of over 900,000 ‘top secret’ security clearances in the US, implicating one in every 300 citizens – including children, as evidence of the secret network. And further proof, for Assange, that the shadow state is gaining power is in the 6% funding increase for the US military complex despite overall tax revenue dropping 20% since the global financial crisis.

These claims reflect an aspect of WikiLeaks’ ideology located outside general government transparency and accountability activism. While Assange agrees that external government accountability is essential, WikiLeaks’ recent action challenges the categorisation of the group as a benign actor lawfully pursuing governmental accountability and participatory democracy. Rather, it seems Assange seeks to expose something more fundamental – to free us from illusion – he wants, as McKenzie Wark describes, ‘the workings of the world untied’ (see ‘Abstraction/Class’ in A Hacker Manifesto (2004)).

Early in the WikiLeaks media frenzy Guy Rundle insightfully wrote about the progressivist, even Marxist/Leninist motifs in WikiLeaks’ mode of action, as extrapolated from Assange’s 2006 essays ‘State and Terrorist Conspiracies’ and ‘Conspiracy as Governance’. Rundle saw a fissure between the networked global anti-capitalist movement and WikiLeaks’ counter-conspiratorial practice. He saw actions challenging the furtive corporate-state nexus rather than a general push for accountability.

For Rundle, these actions include releasing categorically large volumes of information such that the targeted powers cannot manage the process. Massive leaks, not with the anarchic goal of dissolving governance, but intended to ‘uncouple governance and conspiracy’. Leaks large enough to prohibit regimes from restabilising and eventually incorporating leaking as ‘a safety valve, steadily releasing pressure in a version of Marcuse’s “repressive tolerance”.’

WikiLeaks’ data ‘dumps’

It is precisely this scale of leak however, that provokes the greatest ethical problem for WikiLeaks. Early in September WikiLeaks released its entire cache of unredacted US Embassy Cables after discovering they were accessible using a password published in Guardian journalist David Leigh’s book ‘WikiLeaks: Inside Julian Assange’s War on Secrecy’. Assange explained that once the cables were available online publication was the only rational action to preserve the information’s ability ‘to create reform and stoke revolutions’.

WikiLeaks’ former media partners all publically denounced the action, however Assange argued that condemnation was mainstream media abusing its voice to protect its institutional integrity. Instead, Assange claimed the release enables WikiLeaks to be used as a lens into the failures and biases of mainstream media. He argues that by facilitating comparison of the mainstream media stories and the original sources, the release demonstrates the spin and ‘corruption’ in the most powerful English speaking media institutions.

When asked whether ‘it was acceptable’ to publish the names of individuals who may be endangered by the unredacted cables Assange’s response resonated the ideological position of the organisation. He noted that when WikiLeaks began releasing the cables 18 months prior they established rigorous processes, in concert with major media organisations, to ensure names were properly concealed. They even courted the US State Department for assistance to ensure publishing the cables would not potentially harm informants. However, Assange argued the mainstream media’s editorial decisions, including New York Times’ failure to publish a story on ‘Taskforce 373’ (a military unit performing extra-judicial assassinations in Afghanistan), and redacting the cable that described a Reuters correspondent working for US intelligence indicated coercion by the very ‘shadow state’ Assange was trying to illuminate.

As ‘3000 volumes of international political history over the last 6 years’ and ‘the greatest intellectual political treasure put into the historical record in modern times,’ for Assange, the ethical justification for the bulk publication lies in the character of the material itself and its sufficient size to have ramifications for conspiratorial state actors.

WikiLeaks and lawfulness

These actions however, are a blatant non-observance of the framework of media freedoms and responsibility forged by the early press and still governing media today. Assange’s position suggests that the laws governing media, constitutive of where the public interest lies with respect to ‘the right to know’, are no longer relevant. This ideology, clearly necessary to the WikiLeaks theory, prosecutes WikiLeaks dissociation with lawful transparency activism and highlights the radicalism Assange is willing to pursue to achieve his goals. Indeed Assange’s circumventing legal institutions suggests tacit agreement with legal historian A.W.B Simpson’s criticism of ‘judicial passivity’ in failing to exercise control over ‘the vigilant state’ (see ‘The Judges and the Vigilant State’ (1989) 4 Denning Law Journal 145). That is, the state or executive who at the same time as protecting us from espionage, terrorism and subversion, threatens liberty and seems to engage in deceit and illegal activity on an uncertain scale. Therefore, outside the institutional boundaries of what we have ‘the right to know’, WikiLeaks requires a personal choice whether it is dangerous, or rather a force weighty enough to disrupt the status quo. This, of course, remains and will remain difficult until WikiLeaks’ systemic consequences are better known.

Jake Goldenfein is a PhD student at the Melbourne Law School

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1 Comment | Uncategorized, Media law, law, Internet Law, wikileaks | Tagged: , , , , , | Permalink
Posted by pseudogold

Update on the Federal Government’s Convergence Review

August 26, 2011

By Elisabeth K. Cooke

The Department of Broadband, Communications and the Digital Economy is in the process of completing a convergence review of the media and communications laws and regulatory frameworks that apply withinAustralia. The convergence review has stimulated a tremendous debate across the industry.

As older media and communications technologies converge on the Internet, the Convergence Review was formed to examine the changes effected on consumers, business and government and propose new regulations for the digital landscape.

Upon release of the Framing Paper in June 2011, the Convergence review received 72 submissions addressing the eight principles and policy concerns raised by the Convergence Review Framing Paper. The submissions detailed overwhelming support for the review and in depth discussion and feedback on the eight principles and corresponding policy issues addressed in the Framing Paper. Many submissions included other principles and issues that should be considered by the Review Committee.

The eight principles listed in the framing paper broadly addresses: diversity and competition, local and Australian content, community standards, consumer and citizens rights and spectrum allocation. While these principles read like a wish list in a newly converged environment, they raise significant challenges and difficulties. For instance, Principle 5 states that:

‘Communications and media services available to Australians should reflect community standards and the views and expectations of the Australian public’.

However, within such a diverse nation, the fundamental step of defining whose ‘community standard’ is to be the measuring stick in assessing the ‘Australian public’ is absent.

Lawmakers will likely face significant challenges when drafting regulations to fit across all platforms in a converged environment. Complicating the review process even more, these new regulations must be able to anticipate future technological advancements within an industry that has the potential to change dramatically overnight. Social networking raises its head once again, blurring the line between the consumer and creator, further complicating a new regulatory scheme.

However, the difficulties with the convergence review do not stop with technological challenges. The review itself will not address copyright law, classification law, competition issues regarding the National Broadband Network, comparative international approaches orAustralia’s international obligations.

While the Convergence Review is a welcome opportunity to update media and communications law to reflect current technologies and strengthen an industry, the results may not be quite so simple.

The Convergence Review can be followed on the Department of Broadband, Communications and the Digital Economy website, and on twitter.

Elisabeth Cooke recently received a JD from the Melbourne Law School and works for the Centre for Media and Communications Law

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Posted by clarissaterry

WikiLeaks is a force for good?

June 30, 2011

I was recently invited to attend the Intelligence Squared debate asking whether ‘WikiLeaks was a force for good?’ and contribute a small article about the debate for the organiser’s newsletter (the St James Ethics Centre). The article was to be a legal companion to the article contemplating the ethical aspects of WikiLeaks by Dr Simon Longstaff, Executive Director of the St James Ethics Centre and Chair of the Intelligence Squared Australia debates. At the debate, this polemical issue provoked a tempestuous dispute by extremely gifted speakers including: Dr Suelette Dreyfus (author of ‘Underground’), Kristinn Hrafnsson (current spokesman for WikiLeaks), and Professor Stuart Rees (Emeritus Professor at Sydney University and Director of Sydney Peace Foundation) for the positive; and Gareth Evans (former Foreign Minister), Tom Switzer (political writer, editor, adviser and lecturer), and Dr Michael Fullilove (Director of the Global Issues Program at the Lowy Institute) for the negative. Interestingly, the poll results from before and after the debate suggest that while those believing WikiLeaks is a force for good remained undeterred, those undecided before the debate were markedly influenced against the proposition by the end. The precise results, as well as the audio of the debate are available from the IQ2 website.  – Jake Goldenfein

 

WikiLeaks is a Force for Good

By Dr Simon Longstaff

Speaking at the 25th Asia Pacific Roundtable in Kuala Lumpur in June 2011 Rowan Callick (The Australian) quoted Australia’s Ambassador to the United States, Kim Beazley who stated “[WikiLeaks is] like American foreign policy being neutron bombed” – the implication being that while the infrastructure of the US State Department survives, the people within the edifice have been badly damaged. Beazley’s analogy is, at the very least, striking. It is also at the more extreme end of the rhetorical scale employed by WikiLeaks’ critics. The core of Kim Beazley’s argument, however, is shared by many members of the diplomatic community. Their chief complaint is that WikiLeaks has undermined a fundamental precursor for the conduct of diplomacy – the maintenance of confidentiality of communications. The argument goes that, without a guarantee of confidentiality, the otherwise essential exchange of information will be curtailed for fear of exposure. Given that effective diplomacy can prevent or resolve conflicts capable of destroying the lives of innocent people, it is further posited that WikiLeaks is a significant source of harm – and not just a minor inconvenience.

It should be noted that this argument does not rely on the claim that WikiLeaks’ release of cables caused serious harm to those named in the published cables. Appearing before Congress, US Secretary of Defense. Robert Gates, testified that no damage had been done to active operations and that no American life had been put at risk by the activities of WikiLeaks. The fate of those who provided information to US officials, however, may not have been so benign – especially if operating under oppressive regimes in countries where even a modest degree of candour can have dire consequences for the individuals concerned.

At face value the criticism mounted by Beazley and those of like mind would seem to have merit. After all, who would deny that effective diplomacy is an important public good. It is less clear, however, that WikiLeaks acted in a manner to undermine the preconditions for diplomacy. For example, although diplomats require some matters to be kept secret, it does not follow that all matters they claim require secrecy should be accorded this same condition. The scope of the Official Secrets Act in Britain was once so expansive that it included the House of Commons’ dining room menu. No reasonable person would assume secrecy requirements for such details. In fact, much included in the trove of diplomatic cables released by WikiLeaks was mundane. Indeed, the level of American security accorded to the cables was relatively low – with access granted to several million people connected to the Secret Internet Protocol Router Network SIPRNet used to share information in the ‘war on terror’. It is unlikely the United States government would have granted such extensive access if it had considered the cables contained highly sensitive information.

The other point worth noting about the contentious releases is that WikiLeaks subjected itself to external review by agreeing that the editors of mainstream news outlets should vet the material in order to remove any information judged to be genuinely sensitive, This is an important point. In the case of the US cables, at least, WikiLeaks was prepared to accept the judgement of editors who society routinely trusts to be prudent and responsible when determining what should or should not be published. The editors involved in handling the sensitive diplomatic material have been explicit about their determination to exclude material that would have caused risk, rather than mere embarrassment, to others.

As most commentators have noted, the debate about WikiLeaks is about much more than the particular case of how the US diplomatic cables were handled. The larger question concerns the extent to which society should have access to public information that is relevant to its interests. There is a significant difference, however, between what is in the public interest and what the public happens to be interested in – a distinction not always applied by the media. Governments often claim to be guardians of the public interest. They claim a corresponding right to decide what the public should know – and when we should know it. It is also clear, however, that governments will often make decisions in line with personal or political interests – interests that are not always aligned with those of their citizens. Add to this the kind of caution that would include a dining room menu under an official secrets act and it soon becomes evident that it would be unwise to rely exclusively on the judgement of governments.

The vast majority of people recognise the importance of maintaining some measure of secrecy in their own lives. They also know governments must keep some matters secret, for example for reasons of national security. What WikiLeaks has prompted is a public discussion about where the balance should lie. The June 2011 Intelligence Squared debate which is now available at iq2oz.com pondered the proposition WikiLeaks is a force for good. Speakers for: Dr Suelette Dreyfus, Kristinn Hrafnsson, current spokesperson for WikiLeaks, Professor Stuart Rees. Speakers against: Gareth Evans, Dr Michael Fullilove, Tom Switzer.

Dr Simon Longstaff is Executive Director of St James Ethics Centre and Chair of Intelligence Squared Australia debates.

This article will also be published in the St James Ethics Centre Newsletter and at thepunch.com

 

WikiLeaks: legal status and political choices

By Jake Goldenfein

A survey of whether or not WikiLeaks is a force for good does not necessarily consider the legality of its actions. At this stage there is only indirect legal action against WikiLeaks. For example, many consider the accusations against Assange to be politically directed at the WikiLeaks organisation, and the severe incarceration of Bradley Manning, the source of a great deal of WikiLeaks material, surely has a deterrent motivation targeting potential leakers. Beyond that, neither WikiLeaks nor its activities are outlawed. A Grand Jury in the US is attempting to assemble a case against WikiLeaks for crimes under the Espionage Act, Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, and for conspiracy, however most commentators consider constitutional free speech protections to be a significant impediment to prosecution. But WikiLeaks legal status also reflects its ‘organisational status.’ That is to say, whether WikiLeaks is considered a journalistic organisation, a publishing organisation, or simply a source, affects which laws are relevant. The laws applicable to each category vary, and despite often being treated by mainstream media as simply a source of leaks, WikiLeaks is not being prosecuted as such, meaning it need only comply with laws relevant for journalists or publishers. American precedent such as the famous Pentagon Papers case suggests that the messy balance between the administration’s need for secrecy and the public’s right and need to know should enable the administration to function, subject to occasional disclosures to keep it honest. ‘The rare exceptions would require a combination of high likelihood, magnitude, and immediacy of harm to justify suppression,’ meaning there is a very high threshold to WikiLeaks prosecution under that doctrine.

It is difficult to assess whether WikiLeaks legal situation would be different if pursued under Australian law considering we have no express constitutional right to free speech (though we do have an implied right of political communication), and our whistle-blowing laws do not apply to the media at large. Commonwealth v John Fairfax and Sons (1980) 147 CLR 39 (‘Defence Papers Case’) and Attorney-General v Heinemann Publishers (1987) 8 NSWLR 341; (1988) 165 CLR 30 (‘Spycatcher’) are potentially relevant Australian cases indicating that under our law WikiLeaks may be exposed to a breach of confidence action, and the Fairfax case points out that copyright may also be relied upon where documents are copied. But prospects of success are not guaranteed and there are some important limitations and qualifications on liability (for instance the defence of fair dealing for purposes of news reporting vis-à-vis copyright, the need to demonstrate Australian public interests vis-à-vis breach of confidence). Of course assessments here will be very fact specific and we do not necessarily know all the relevant facts at this stage. Katy Barnett wrote a nice piece on ‘Spycatcher and Wikileaks’ in the January issue of the Fortnightly Review.

Despite its relatively stable legal status, WikiLeaks has certainly still come under attack from institutional actors. And those attacks, generally effected through privately owned intermediaries, expose some of the more concerning aspects of the new media environment in relation to freedom of the press. ‘Extra-legal’ actions (including denial of service cyber-attacks) by companies that control crucial aspects of cyber-infrastructure like Visa, Mastercard, Paypal, EveryDNS, and Amazon, betray a private-public partnership with dangerous censorship implications. Scholars like Yochai Benkler suggest these censorship actions would have been practically impossible under legal and constitutional frameworks.

After the original reaction to the ‘CableGate’ leaks, the rhetorical framing of WikiLeaks shifted away from a major threat to the peaceful world order towards a more realistic suggestion that it undermines the checks, balances and accountability established within traditional media organisations. Indeed, no significant harm (apart from embarrassment) to any diplomatic or military institution has yet been claimed as a consequence of the leaks, suggesting the established media and state institutions reacted primarily from a motivation of anxiety than actual danger. However, that anxiety could be valid, as WikiLeaks may have serious implications for traditional media models as well has profound consequences for nation states and democracy. For example, Professor John Keane from University of Sydney places WikiLeaks at the vanguard of the emerging ‘monitory democracy’ in which democracy has shifted away from simple ‘parliamentary democracy’ towards a form of democracy that includes the permanent scrutiny of power wherever it is exercised.

Therefore, if we take the starting position that WikiLeaks’ publication of materials (often in conjunction with mainstream media) is not clearly illegal (although not clearly legal either), and that the releases seem to have caused no real damage to date at least, then deciding whether or not WikiLeaks is a force for good requires the personal determination of whether we approve of WikiLeaks’ fundament and mission, an inherently political decision. On the whole do we consider the outcomes of WikiLeaks’ actions beneficial?

WikiLeaks’ neutron bomb effect described above by Dr Longstaff, may indeed curtail some exchange of information, however that itself is not determinative of whether the outcomes of WikiLeaks actions are positive or negative. Without doubt governments need secrecy for certain actions (for example effective diplomatic practice), however they also need sufficient trust from the citizenry to maintain that secrecy. Raimond Gaita recently said in a lecture at Melbourne Law School that the current political situation (for example the spin and misinformation) has led to an absence of the conditions of sober judgement and ultimately an incapacity for people to consent to their states’ actions. In that sense WikiLeaks is facilitating the information necessary for consensual governance. Another fundamental effect was described by Glenn Greenwald, who recently wrote that the republican ideal requires that governments are transparent and citizens are private, yet the past decade has seen a wholesale reversal of that ideal. WikiLeaks therefore stands as a subversion of that reversal, a goal that goes beyond embarrassing diplomats or bringing political pressure to end a senseless war. Finally, commentator Guy Rundel has argued WikiLeaks gives whistleblowers a new choice, a chance to avoid the decision between life and truth, with the outcome that pursuing honesty can result in a flourishing of life rather than a suicide mission. Perhaps these outcomes are worth diplomats being slightly more cautious in how they communicate, or perhaps not.

Jake Goldenfein is a PhD student at the Melbourne Law School

This article will also be published in the St James Ethics Centre Newsletter.

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Fordham IP Conference 2011, New York City

June 2, 2011

By Vicki Huang

The Fordham IP conference – “Learn, Debate, Have Fun” – was held on 28 – 29th April 2011 in New York City.  The conference attracted many academics, practitioners, government officials, and members of the judiciary from Europe, the USA and of course Australasia.  This combination triggered a lot of informed debate and it was refreshing to hear input from all sides of contentious issues including views from the bench.

Many of the sessions have been covered by our friends at IPKAT here, here, here, here, here and here.  In addition to those sessions, the Fortnightly Review was lucky to attend several specific sessions on copyright and trade mark law and highlights are outlined below.

In a session on “US Copyright Developments”, Thomas Kjellberg updated the audience on copyright cases against “suburban” downloaders where damages peaked at over $1 million dollars. These cases such as Capital Records v Thomas Rassett have sparked a debate as to whether such awards violate due process.  Kjellberg also discussed the case of Penguin v American Buddha. In that case, American Buddha (a religious not-for-profit), posted ebooks on its website. One of the issues for the court was locating the site of the injury. Was it in New York (home of the plaintiff), or Arizona (the site of the uploader) or Texas (the site of the server)?  The court held that because the location of the infringer may be remote, it would not be fair to use the infringer’s location as the locus of harm. Therefore, even though there was no downloading evidence in New York, that was not to say there was “no injury” in New York.  Rather the test should assess the intent of the infringer.

In a session on “EU and US Initial Interest Confusion in Trade Mark Law”, The Hon. Mr Justice Arnold discussed the development of the doctrine and its actionability under Article 9(1)(b).  He went on to discuss several cases including the recent case of Och-Ziff Management Europe Ltd.  Daniel Glazer discussed US developments with a focus on the expansion of the doctrine to the internet, where trademarks are used in domain names or in meta tags or keywords.  The panel discussed the fine line between confusion and diversion and the fact that US courts are really trying to protect senior mark good will and against unfair competition.  The panel debated what was permissible and indeed healthy free riding.  They also debated the merits of using the initial interest confusion doctrine to police domain names.  The panel agreed that in the current era, consumers are used to deceitful metatags and more wary of commercialised hyperlinks so confusion is a lot less likely. Professor Anne Bartow argued that one can no longer assume that consumers are unsophisticated.  She went on to query whether the law should remedy a situation where there is confusion that is cured before the point of sale.

In a session discussing dilution Law in the European Union & the United States, Trevor Cook (Bird and Bird) began with a discussion of the EU’s approach.  He noted the over-intellectualisation of simple legal tests which was a common complaint in several other panels.  Professor Marshall Leaffer discussed US developments in dilution and the case of Visa v JSL Corp.  In that case, Professor Leafer argued that the question of likelihood of confusion – which is a question of fact – was approached in a fast and loose manner. He also said that the case highlighted that the evidence required to prove a dilution case was very unclear. A European speaker helpfully reminded the audience that reconciling EU and US policy and legal approaches was not simple as there is no unfair competition law in the UK and some other EU states.

The well-attended sunrise seminar on “Rule of Law on the Internet: Feasible or Fantasy”, started with views from Richard Cotton of NBC Universal Media.  He stated that the question was not “whether” we should have a rule of law on the internet, but rather “when” and “how”.  He discussed a fundamental problem being one of attitude, with many downloaders thinking that “if it’s so easy to pirate, it can’t be wrong”.  Piracy is moving from being treated as a nuisance, to a problem that the FBI and homeland security are now enforcing against.

In terms of legitimizing tools, he discussed the development of ancillary markets and goods such as Netflix, and Xbox live which are robust and legitimate markets that rely on internet streaming technologies.  In his view, encouragement of these delivery models will give illegal downloaders a legitimate alternative.  However, he emphasised that the challenge will be to create a culture that will accept copyright piracy as a wrong and likened this to being a parent training a recalcitrant child.

Justice Peter Charleton commented that the EU has compulsory anonymity on internet. And that a cultural problem was that anti-globalism is a big movement so that theft from “anonymous capitalist” was thought to be ok. The panel agreed that IP theft was like drug addiction where demand generates supply.

In the session, “Enforcement Issues Including New Government Initiatives”, Stevan Mitchell (the ESA) and Peter Fowler (USPTO Enforcement) discussed the extent of the enforcement problem.  Twenty five per cent of all internet traffic globally involves unauthorized distribution of copyright files.  One assessment had 43 illegal downloading websites register 146 million hits per day.  Bottom line is that there is a huge appetite for TV and film downloading.  Peter Fowler emphasised the need for cultural change akin to the shift that led to seatbelt wearing.  He also discussed the US “Operation in our Sites” which had been seizing domain names of illegal download sites.  He emphasized that the academic debate over whether creative adaptations should be free was moot as copyright infringement is illegal and a crime.  For enforcement officers there was no debate.  He also highlighted a shift in counterfeiting.  Counterfeiters are now trying to make higher profits by making goods as close as possible to the real luxury item and selling goods on deceptive websites at matching prices (as opposed to a severely discounted price that would indicate a “fake”) in order the maximise profits.

Other paths of enforcement include cooperative agreements between registries to seize domain names.  Importantly it is also to target 3rd party providers eg agents for service and paypal.  If money supply can be cut off, then enforcement agencies will try to do so.

In the session “Trademark Law: Smell and Look-a-likes: a Comparative Analysis” Anna Carboni presented an update on smell and look alike cases including the controversial L’Oreal v Bellure case.  Carboni highlighted the fact that the British Brands study showed the customers can be easily confused by look alike packaging. The panel including Robert Burrell pointed out that surveys used in the British Brands study and other surveys used to support a senior mark owner are flawed due to the prevalence of leading questions.  On another point, Jane Ginsburg re-emphasised that “lured” does not mean confused.  Consumers learn for example, that supermarket shelves are stocked with similar looking house brands.  The Hon. Justice Robin Jacobs agreed saying that judges shop and are also aware of brand generics.  The question should be whether reasonable customers are likely to be confused and whether the company intended to confuse consumers.  Justice Jacobs observed that brand owners are now scared to sue “home brands” which are put out by supermarkets because supermarkets may retaliate and not stock the senior brand.

In the session “Adwords: a Comparative Analysis” Professor Marshall Leaffer discussed the proposition that after the case of Rescue.com, selling trademarks as keywords is “use in commerce” and subject to the Lanham Act.  Professor Barton Beebe discussed the increase in consumer sophistication and that the legal question had moved on from “use” to “likelihood of confusion” and in the future will be preoccupied with predicting levels of consumer sophistication.

Prof. Dr. Peter Ruess presented a convincing case for protection of well-known brands.  Interestingly calling it naïve to use the phrase “comparative advertising” in cases that were clearly “bait and switch”.  The panel seemed divided on the line between “genuine” comparative advertising and the misappropriation of goodwill.  Ruess argued that using the goodwill of a senior mark to lure a customer is not comparative advertising and is not in the public interest.  Professor Beebe argued that encouraging free competition is in the public interest.  The panel seemed divided between recognising the property rights of high investing brand owners and free competition.

Overall this was a fascinating and informative conference.  The program and list of speakers can be found here.  Proceedings of the conference will also be published in an upcoming volume.

Vicki Huang is a Research Associate with IPRIA and a Lecturer at Deakin Law School

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The Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement (TPPA) IP Chapter

May 6, 2011

By Melissa de Zwart

Nine countries are currently negotiating the Trans Pacific Partnership Agreement: US, Australia, New Zealand, Singapore, Chile, Malaysia, Brunei Darussalam, Vietnam and Peru. Under the terms of this agreement, signatories will be required to amend their domestic intellectual property laws to comply with the terms of the TPPA. The US draft of the intellectual property chapter of the trade agreement was leaked in February 2011 generating significant controversy regarding its draconian terms. The leaked chapter is available here at Michael Geist’s blog.

Some key aspects of the draft are as follows:

Geographical Indications

A party must provide that geographical indications (GIs) are eligible for protection as trademarks. For this purpose geographical indications are defined as ‘indications that identify a good as originating in the territory of a Party, or a region or locality in that territory, where a given quality, reputation, or other characteristic of the good is essentially attributable to its geographical origin. Any sign or combination of signs (such as words, including geographical and personal names, as well as letters, numerals, figurative elements, and colors, including single colors), in any form whatsoever’.

The TPPA provides for a registration of GIs if recognized by a member party. Of course, in Australia, GI protection currently extends only to wine and spirits, under the Wine Australia Corporation Act 1980 (Cth). This scheme was introduced to give effect to Australia’s obligations under TRIPS and, more specifically, the Australia-European Community Agreement on Trade in Wine 2008 (and it is predecessor signed in 1994). It is precisely this sort of agreement (reached in order to secure access to the European market for Australian winemakers) which would be prohibited by the TPPA.

Article 2 (which deals with trademarks and GIs) provides that no party shall (whether pursuant to an agreement with another government or otherwise):

  • Prohibit third parties from using translated versions of the geographical indications for goods other than wines or spirits;
  • Prohibit third parties from using a term that is ‘evoked by’ the geographical indication;
  • Prohibit third party uses of any component of a multi-component geographical indication protected by virtue of the agreement, even if such components are generic or use would not give rise to confusion (Clause 17).

For the purposes of the Agreement, a term is generic if it is customary in common language as the common name for the goods or services associated with the term or GI (Clause 18).

Clause 19 sets out a range of factors which may be taken into account in determining whether the terms is generic, such as whether:

  • persons other than the person claiming the rights use that term as the name for the product; and
  • the product is imported into the relevant country, in significant quantities, from outside the proposed protected region using the same name.

This is contrary to the current Australian regime, and particularly the Australia-EC Wine Agreement, which prohibits the use of certain traditional expressions and required the phasing out of local uses of specific GIs, despite their long-term use in Australia.

Clause 22 provides for the non-misleading use and/or registration of signs or indications that reference a geographical area that is not the true place of origin of the product of the product or services other than for wines or spirits, provided that:

a)     the sign or indication is used in a manner that does not mislead the public as to the geographical origin of the goods or services;

b)     the use does not constitute an act of unfair competition;

c)      use would not cause a likelihood of confusion with an earlier trade mark or GI; and

d)     the request for registration does not relate to a generic term.
This reflects the two tier system for GI protection provided for in Articles 22 and 23 of TRIPS, which recognize a higher level of protection for wine and spirits, extending to non-misleading and translated uses of GIs.

Copyright

Article 4 extends the rights granted to authors, performers and producers of phonograms to all forms of reproduction of their works/ performances including temporary storage in electronic form.  The temporary reproduction right proved particularly controversial during the negotiations that resulted in the WIPO Copyright Treaty (WCT) and ultimately could not be resolved at that meeting. Rather, it was dealt with by way of the Agreed Statement to Article 8. (‘It is understood that the mere provision of physical facilities for enabling or making a communication does not in itself amount to communication within the meaning of this Treaty or the Berne Convention. It is further understood that nothing in Article 8 precludes a Contracting Party from applying Article 11bis(2)’). The inclusion of the temporary reproduction right here in the TPPA without further fanfare or disclosure is particularly tricksy on the part of the US and is likely to cause significant debate!

Other notable expansions of copyright include:

  • Prohibition on parallel importation, even of goods manufactured with authorization of the copyright owner outside of the relevant territory.
  • Copyright terms are extended to life plus 70 years for individuals (already the case in Australia) and between 95 and 120 years for corporate works.

The relevant exceptions and limitations are left blank with only a ‘placeholder’ marking their potential inclusion (an ominous lack of attention to detail, given the foreshadowed expansion of rights) although it is noted with respect to the above, one of the possible exceptions would relate to internet retransmission.

Technological protection measures

Technological protection measures are yet again the focus of strengthening efforts. Parties are required to provide that any act of circumvention or dealing in circumvention devices or services shall be subject to civil and criminal penalties. Criminal penalties apply to anyone other than a non-profit library, archive, educational institution or public noncommercial broadcasting entity, who engages in circumvention ‘for purposes of commercial advantage or private financial gain’. Circumvention gives rise to liability independent from any infringement of copyright.

Exceptions and limitations to the anti-circumvention provisions must be confined to the purposes defined in paragraphs (d) and (e).

The narrowness of these exceptions will require amendment of Australia’s TPM provisions which currently require that a TPM be an ‘access control technological protection measure’ which effectively excludes protection of TPMs which protect region coding and TPMs embodied in machines or devices, not directed primarily to protecting copyright.

ISP liability

Article 16 provides for ‘Special Measures Relating to Enforcement in the Digital Environment’. Notably, Clause 3(a) requires parties to provide ‘legal incentives for service providers to cooperate with copyright owners in deterring the unauthorized storage and transmission of copyrighted materials.’ Given the current global climate regarding ISP liability and the decision of the Full Federal Court in the iiNet decision, this would impose significant pressure on the Australian government to reform the law. This is subject to compliance with the US DMCA safe-harbor provisions.

Conclusions

As expressed in this leaked US draft, the provisions of the TPPA, particularly those relating to copyright, appear to be more restrictive than ACTA. Some commentators have hypothesized that the ambit claims made in the leaked document are so extreme that the US is playing a negotiating tactic that allows them to significantly back down from this position and still come out ahead in terms of outcomes. Whilst this remains to be seen, it has reminded us that the parameters of intellectual property rights remain contested and vulnerable to being traded away in the international trade environment.

Dr Melissa de Zwart is an Associate Professor in Law at the University of Adelaide.

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Weapons in the Piracy Wars: COICA and Domain Name Seizures

March 17, 2011

By Jake Goldenfein

You may have encountered this image if you recently tried to stream a sporting event online. Domain name seizures in the US occur under civil forfeiture and seizure provisions in the Crimes and Criminal Procedure title of the United States Code. Being territorially restricted, those provisions allow the US Immigration and Customs Enforcement agency (ICE) to distrain websites with a .com, .net or .org suffix.

Recent seizures of websites linking streamed sporting events (conveniently 10 days before the Super Bowl) were the directive of phase 3 of ICE’s Operation ‘In Our Sites,’ which began in June 2010. The mandate of ‘In Our Sites’ goes beyond sporting events however, and has targeted websites connected to counterfeit goods, child pornography and first-run movies. Although the process and propriety of those seizures have been questioned, presently working its way through the US political system is the Combating Online Infringement and Counterfeits Act (COICA) that will provide an expedited process to block domains and extend ICE’s reach to content hosted outside the US.

COICA (S. 3804) would authorise the Attorney General to obtain injunctions in rem against websites ‘dedicated to infringing activities.’ Sites are defined as dedicated to infringing activities if ‘primarily designed’, have ‘no demonstrable commercially significant purpose or use other than,’ or are ‘marketed by its operator,’ as offering copyright infringing goods.

Effectively, COICA creates an internet blacklist with ‘offending’ websites added by Court order. Originally there was a second blacklist controlled by the Attorney General without judicial oversight, however that was jettisoned in the bill’s latest iteration. By obtaining a Federal Court injunction, the Attorney General orders U.S. domain name registrars to stop resolving blacklisted domains, leading users instead to an error message.

For infringing domains outside of the U.S, the bill demands internet service providers block offending foreign addresses. This does not prevent access outside of U.S territory, but rather is aimed at preventing the importation into the US (censoring) of goods and services offered by websites deemed ‘dedicated’ to infringing activities.

Introduced by Democratic Senator Patrick Leahy in September, the bill received unanimous approval by the Senate Judiciary Committee in November 2010 under Leahy’s chair. Not surprisingly three of Leahy’s top five campaign contributors are large media organisations. Yet substantial opposition from various groups including Internet Engineers, Human Rights Groups, the Net Coalition, some Senators, and law professors has been successful in preventing the bill passing a full vote on the Senate floor, leading to another Judiciary Committee hearing on 16 February, which led to discussion of substantial modification, and likely a follow-up hearing.

Arguments against the bill include:

  • Blacklisting of websites by Justice Department officials without sufficient judicial oversight offends due process and threatens legitimate political speech.
  • Definitions within the bill, including ‘facilitating infringement’ and ‘dedicated to infringing activities’ are very broad.
  • Blacklisting for copyright infringement purposes may undermine U.S. secondary liability law as well as existing copyright exceptions, limitations and defences.
  • The censorship process causes entire domains to vanish, not just infringing pages or files.
  • The bill creates precedent for internet censorship, and congress should consider the effect for countries less protective of citizens’ rights of free expression.
  • The extraterritorial reach of the court prevents a full and fair trial with all interested parties present.
  • The bill may affect legitimate digital services such as cyberlockers if the Department of Justice decides that piracy is ‘central’ to their businesses.
  • Blacklisting may apply to sites that discuss and advocate for P2P technology or piracy because they sometimes link tools and information intended for file sharing, despite the otherwise political nature of their speech.
  • Censorship may undermine the stability of the internet by encouraging the use of circumvention measures and rerouting internet traffic away from the U.S.

But perhaps the most compelling arguments are found in the joint letter from 49 legal academics in the U.S. Citing jurisprudence, they contend ‘the bill amounts to a constitutional abridgment of freedom of speech because it directs courts to impose “prior restraints” on speech, which are the most serious and least tolerable infringement of First Amendment rights.’ They argue such cases ‘require a court, before the material is completely removed from circulation to make a final determination that material is unlawful after an adversary hearing.’

Contrary to that requirement, the professors claim ‘the Act permits the issuance of speech-suppressing injunctions without any meaningful opportunity for any party to contest the Attorney General’s allegations of unlawful content’ because of inadequate notice provisions and the capacity to enter injunctions ex parte. Requiring the shut down of entire domains rather than blocking specific content is described in the letter as ‘burning down the house to roast the pig.’

More profound however, is the academics’ claim that the bill’s ‘egregious Constitutional infirmities… will not survive judicial scrutiny’ suggesting its significance ‘is entirely symbolic.’ This would be the first time the US would require internet service providers to block speech because of its content. Enjoining ISPs to police users’ activities is an issue of growing judicial significance, not simply in circumstances like the iiNet case in Australia, but also for a range of future measures, including filtering, censorship and levying, that may require ISP cooperation.

Content industries have sought this law for years, and view the new capabilities as a magic bullet for copyright enforcement, with the MPAA and RIAA extensively lobbying for its passage. Lauding the legislation, the bill’s proponents emphasize the derisory economic consequences affected by infringing rogue sites. Previous MPAA interim boss Bob Pisano defended the bill, claiming targeted sites ‘exist for one purpose only – to make a profit using the internet to distribute the stolen and counterfeited goods and ideas of others,’ and that the ‘economic impact of these activities – millions of lost jobs and dollars – is profound.’ Pisano argues the First Amendment was not intended as a shield for those who steal, irrespective of the means. ‘Theft is theft, whether it occurs in a dark alley or in the ether, and to attempt to distinguish the two is to undermine the most basic tenets of our criminal laws.’

Clearly rhetoric laden, such speech reverts back to the questionable conflation of tangible and intellectual goods, and co-opts morality for its justification without acknowledging the concomitant censorship issues. However, other Hollywood groups have claimed that concerns of unlawful censorship are an ‘absurd misrepresentation of civic rights’.

For organisations like MPAA and RIAA who maintain a controversial program of prosecuting online copyright infringement, the new law would amount to another weapon in the arsenal of content protection. But beyond copyright, the bill highlights emerging issues in digital censorship and jurisdiction by entrenching in U.S law filtering of international content that offends local laws – a dangerous precedent that may expand to other types of speech. Passage of this bill would mark a substantial shift in lawmakers’ willingness to regulate cyberspace and a fortiori against the principle of the Single Global Internet.

Jake Goldenfein is a PhD candidate at the Melbourne Law School

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