In this Edition # 26…

May 6, 2011

Dr Melissa de Zwart outlines the obligations that may be imposed on signatories to the future Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement (TPPA) under the Recently leaked draft intellectual property chapter. Highlighting the ACTA plus provisions, Melissa de Zwart points out key issues related to copyright, geographical indicators, technical protection measures and ISP liability.

And Shaun Larcom provides a review of Gaetan de Rassenfosse’s recent empirical paper investigating the differences in quantity and motivation and of patent exploitation in small and large enterprises.

We note the recent Fordham IP Conference in New York, covered very comprehensively by IPKat, has generated much discussion on emerging issues which will be covered in the next edition.


The Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement (TPPA) IP Chapter

May 6, 2011

By Melissa de Zwart

Nine countries are currently negotiating the Trans Pacific Partnership Agreement: US, Australia, New Zealand, Singapore, Chile, Malaysia, Brunei Darussalam, Vietnam and Peru. Under the terms of this agreement, signatories will be required to amend their domestic intellectual property laws to comply with the terms of the TPPA. The US draft of the intellectual property chapter of the trade agreement was leaked in February 2011 generating significant controversy regarding its draconian terms. The leaked chapter is available here at Michael Geist’s blog.

Some key aspects of the draft are as follows:

Geographical Indications

A party must provide that geographical indications (GIs) are eligible for protection as trademarks. For this purpose geographical indications are defined as ‘indications that identify a good as originating in the territory of a Party, or a region or locality in that territory, where a given quality, reputation, or other characteristic of the good is essentially attributable to its geographical origin. Any sign or combination of signs (such as words, including geographical and personal names, as well as letters, numerals, figurative elements, and colors, including single colors), in any form whatsoever’.

The TPPA provides for a registration of GIs if recognized by a member party. Of course, in Australia, GI protection currently extends only to wine and spirits, under the Wine Australia Corporation Act 1980 (Cth). This scheme was introduced to give effect to Australia’s obligations under TRIPS and, more specifically, the Australia-European Community Agreement on Trade in Wine 2008 (and it is predecessor signed in 1994). It is precisely this sort of agreement (reached in order to secure access to the European market for Australian winemakers) which would be prohibited by the TPPA.

Article 2 (which deals with trademarks and GIs) provides that no party shall (whether pursuant to an agreement with another government or otherwise):

  • Prohibit third parties from using translated versions of the geographical indications for goods other than wines or spirits;
  • Prohibit third parties from using a term that is ‘evoked by’ the geographical indication;
  • Prohibit third party uses of any component of a multi-component geographical indication protected by virtue of the agreement, even if such components are generic or use would not give rise to confusion (Clause 17).

For the purposes of the Agreement, a term is generic if it is customary in common language as the common name for the goods or services associated with the term or GI (Clause 18).

Clause 19 sets out a range of factors which may be taken into account in determining whether the terms is generic, such as whether:

  • persons other than the person claiming the rights use that term as the name for the product; and
  • the product is imported into the relevant country, in significant quantities, from outside the proposed protected region using the same name.

This is contrary to the current Australian regime, and particularly the Australia-EC Wine Agreement, which prohibits the use of certain traditional expressions and required the phasing out of local uses of specific GIs, despite their long-term use in Australia.

Clause 22 provides for the non-misleading use and/or registration of signs or indications that reference a geographical area that is not the true place of origin of the product of the product or services other than for wines or spirits, provided that:

a)     the sign or indication is used in a manner that does not mislead the public as to the geographical origin of the goods or services;

b)     the use does not constitute an act of unfair competition;

c)      use would not cause a likelihood of confusion with an earlier trade mark or GI; and

d)     the request for registration does not relate to a generic term.
This reflects the two tier system for GI protection provided for in Articles 22 and 23 of TRIPS, which recognize a higher level of protection for wine and spirits, extending to non-misleading and translated uses of GIs.

Copyright

Article 4 extends the rights granted to authors, performers and producers of phonograms to all forms of reproduction of their works/ performances including temporary storage in electronic form.  The temporary reproduction right proved particularly controversial during the negotiations that resulted in the WIPO Copyright Treaty (WCT) and ultimately could not be resolved at that meeting. Rather, it was dealt with by way of the Agreed Statement to Article 8. (‘It is understood that the mere provision of physical facilities for enabling or making a communication does not in itself amount to communication within the meaning of this Treaty or the Berne Convention. It is further understood that nothing in Article 8 precludes a Contracting Party from applying Article 11bis(2)’). The inclusion of the temporary reproduction right here in the TPPA without further fanfare or disclosure is particularly tricksy on the part of the US and is likely to cause significant debate!

Other notable expansions of copyright include:

  • Prohibition on parallel importation, even of goods manufactured with authorization of the copyright owner outside of the relevant territory.
  • Copyright terms are extended to life plus 70 years for individuals (already the case in Australia) and between 95 and 120 years for corporate works.

The relevant exceptions and limitations are left blank with only a ‘placeholder’ marking their potential inclusion (an ominous lack of attention to detail, given the foreshadowed expansion of rights) although it is noted with respect to the above, one of the possible exceptions would relate to internet retransmission.

Technological protection measures

Technological protection measures are yet again the focus of strengthening efforts. Parties are required to provide that any act of circumvention or dealing in circumvention devices or services shall be subject to civil and criminal penalties. Criminal penalties apply to anyone other than a non-profit library, archive, educational institution or public noncommercial broadcasting entity, who engages in circumvention ‘for purposes of commercial advantage or private financial gain’. Circumvention gives rise to liability independent from any infringement of copyright.

Exceptions and limitations to the anti-circumvention provisions must be confined to the purposes defined in paragraphs (d) and (e).

The narrowness of these exceptions will require amendment of Australia’s TPM provisions which currently require that a TPM be an ‘access control technological protection measure’ which effectively excludes protection of TPMs which protect region coding and TPMs embodied in machines or devices, not directed primarily to protecting copyright.

ISP liability

Article 16 provides for ‘Special Measures Relating to Enforcement in the Digital Environment’. Notably, Clause 3(a) requires parties to provide ‘legal incentives for service providers to cooperate with copyright owners in deterring the unauthorized storage and transmission of copyrighted materials.’ Given the current global climate regarding ISP liability and the decision of the Full Federal Court in the iiNet decision, this would impose significant pressure on the Australian government to reform the law. This is subject to compliance with the US DMCA safe-harbor provisions.

Conclusions

As expressed in this leaked US draft, the provisions of the TPPA, particularly those relating to copyright, appear to be more restrictive than ACTA. Some commentators have hypothesized that the ambit claims made in the leaked document are so extreme that the US is playing a negotiating tactic that allows them to significantly back down from this position and still come out ahead in terms of outcomes. Whilst this remains to be seen, it has reminded us that the parameters of intellectual property rights remain contested and vulnerable to being traded away in the international trade environment.

Dr Melissa de Zwart is an Associate Professor in Law at the University of Adelaide.

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Review: “How SMEs Exploit their Intellectual Property Assets: Evidence from Survey Data” by Gaetan de Rassenfosse

May 6, 2011

By Shaun Larcom

Why does a firm apply for a patent? Using data from an international survey of firms conducted by the European Patent Office, de Rassenfosse answers this question with some interesting results, particularly in relation to how motivations differ by firm size. As expected, he finds most firms, regardless of size, primarily use patents to protect their technology from imitation. However, he finds small and medium enterprises (SMEs) are much more motivated by monetary reasons, while large firms are more motivated by a desire protect their freedom to operate. But perhaps most importantly the paper highlights the importance of patents as a signalling device for SMEs in attracting finance to commercialise their inventions.

The survey analysed by de Rassenfosse asked firms who had applied for a patent to rate a series of statements to determine their motivations. The ratings ranged between 1 (completely disagree) to 6 (fully agree) and included: imitation (I patent mainly to prevent imitation by competitors); secrecy (I will not patent an innovation that I can keep secret); freedom (I patent mainly to protect my freedom of operation); investors (I take patents in order to convince investors or banks of the value of my invention); and licensing (I take patents in view of licensing).

Source: de Rassenfosse (2010), p20.

As expected and visible above, the most popular motivation was to protect against imitation.  Taking the mean score, this was followed by freedom of operation, attracting investors, and then licensing. In relation to company size, the share of SMEs taking patents for what de Rassenfosse terms monetary reasons (attracting investors and seeking to licence their products) is considerably higher than larger firms – 40% for SMEs in contrast to 15% for larger firms. In addition to preventing imitation, larger firms were mainly concerned with protecting freedom of operation.

His econometric analysis largely confirms that the firms’ stated motivations for patenting align with their actual behaviour. For instance, he finds that firms that take patents with the motivation of attracting investors have a lower share of their patent portfolio unused and more patents that are used internally, as would be expected. More interesting is his analysis of how firms actually use their patent portfolios. He found that SMEs utilise their patents more than large companies and he provides two explanations. First, SMEs are more selective in what they patent given the costs involved, and second, large companies apply more for freedom to operate motives, therefore leaving a greater percent dormant.

While not the focus of the paper, the importance of freedom to operate is worthy of comment, as it suggests that many firms, particularly larger ones, use patents for defensive reasons rather than to exploit their technology. This supports the tragedy of the anticommons thesis advanced by Professor Michael Heller at Columbia University.  His work suggests that too many patents can actually lead to less innovation in fields such as biomedical research due to competing property rights and a lack of co-ordination. Curiously, this dataset suggests that larger firms attempt to deal with the anticommons problem by taking even more patents that they let lie dormant. Apart from the obvious welfare losses brought about by excessive patenting, this dataset confirms that larger firms are more able to defensively patent than smaller firms.

As the title of his paper suggests, de Rassenfosse focuses on analysing the motivations of SMEs, particularly by generating revenues through licensing agreements and in attracting investors. He finds that nearly half of those SMEs sampled take out patents for these reasons.

Worldwide royalty and licence revenues were estimated at around US$100 billion in 2005, and de Rassendosse finds that SMEs have a higher per cent of their patents licensed than larger companies. This result is perhaps not particularly enlightening as it is well known that licensing agreements are a useful method used by smaller firms to generate cash flows, whereas larger firms are more able commercialise and market inventions in-house. Of note however, is the degree licensing differs between Europe and the United States. Considering willingness to licence and the size of the patent portfolio, he finds the share of patents licensed by European SMEs is significantly lower than United States SMEs, which he suggests is due to inefficiencies in the European market for technology.

Perhaps the most interesting element of his paper is the analysis of why using patenting to attract investors is such an important motivator for SMEs rather than larger firms. Citing the literature, he highlights the importance of asymmetric information in the R&D process and the signalling effect of patents, especially for SMEs. The concept of asymmetric information applied to R&D suggests that inventors are more knowledgeable about the likelihood of success and market potential than potential investors. The argument goes that external investors have trouble differentiating between profitable and unprofitable inventions and will therefore not invest in R&D or require a significant risk premium. While large firms have the ability to finance R&D internally, this is often not an option for smaller firms, and as a consequence they must rely on external funders. Here patents can play a significant role.  Smaller firms can use patents to serve as a credible signal that reduces information asymmetry.

De Rassenfosse argues that by taking out patents on promising innovations, the inventor can reveal credible information to investors, which helps them differentiate profitable and unprofitable projects. This suggests that the signalling effect for some firms is more important than preventing imitation, and his results support this conclusion. He finds a negative correlation between the motivations of attracting investors and secrecy, suggesting that firms, particularly SMEs, are willing to disclose extra information and bear patenting costs to attract investors even when there is no need in terms of keeping their technology secret. As concluded by de Rassefosse, this makes it all the more important to ensure that the threshold for granting patents is high, and he would no doubt welcome the intentions behind the Intellectual Property Laws Amendment (Raising the Bar) Bill. Raising the bar on patents has the effect of reinforcing the credibility of the signal a patent can provide, which de Rassenfosse has shown to be particularly important for smaller firms in accessing finance.  As he concludes: ‘The more informative the signal, the more confident investors and the more information asymmetry is reduced.’ (p.13)

Gaetan de Rassenfosse, How SMEs Exploit their Intellectual Property Assets:  Evidence from Survey Data, Intellectual Property Research Institute of Australia Working Paper (IPRIA) No. 8/10, December 2010.

Shaun Larcom is a PhD candidate in Law at University College London’s Centre for Law and Economics

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